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INTRODUCTION
The  debate  about  the  situation  of  the  individual  in  international  law  is  as  old  as  the 
international  law itself.  However it  had never been outdated.  From different  doctrinaire 
positions, the situation of the individual as subject of law in the international sphere has 
been affirmed and rejected since the very beginning. A great deal of the debate has been 
owed to the lack of precision of the concept of subject of the international law itself. As we 
intend to analyze in this work the situation of the individual as subject of the international 
law in the jurispruedence of the Permanent Court of International Justice and International 
Court of Justice, we must first determine this concept.  
Those who had the opportunity of studying the issue will have appreciated the existent 
differences  among  authors  at  specifying  not  only  criteria  determining  the  international 
subjectivity but also the way in which said criteria are applied. 
The category “subjects of international law” is a purely theoretical construction, in respect 
of which there is no uniformity to determine neither what must be understood as such, nor 
how to  fulfill  eventual  criteria  suggested  for  that  definition.  There  is  no  rule  base  on 
international law which may states that certain entities are subjects of the international law, 
and then enlist them. Neither there is a rule which directly establishes the required criteria 
to determine the subjectivity under international law.1 
A fundamental assertion in international law, about the characteristics of the international 
personality arises from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on April 
11th,  1949 in the case of Reparation  for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United 
1 “El derecho no puede prescribir en una norma jurídica que X es sujeto de derecho, porque carecería de  
sentido y sería irrelevante. Aún cuando un orden jurídico contuviera una norma que dijera que X es sujeto de  
derecho, X no sería sujeto si ese ordenamiento no le atribuyera, al menos, un derecho o una obligación. Las  
normas jurídicas no pueden imponer al jurista que considere sujeto a quien no es titular de ningún derecho  
ni  de ninguna obligación”. –  Barberis,  Julio  A:  Los Sujetos del  Derecho Internacional  Actual.  Editorial 
Tecnos. Madrid. 1984, p. 27.
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Nations (Reparation Case)2. It has been an obligatory quotation for all authors dealing 
with the subjects of international law. According to the ICJ: 
 “Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusión that the Organization  
is  an  international  person…What  it  does  mean is  that  it  is  a  subject  of  
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties,  
and that it  has  capacity  to maintain its  rights by bringing international  
claims”. (P.9) (Emphasis added) 
In spite of the substantive elements underlying this important opinion, they have not been 
much analysed in the light of general international law applicable to the individual. 
In  chapter  one,  after  a  brief  reference  of  the  historical  evolution  of  the  international 
subjectivity, we shall precise the criteria for an international personality, and the theoretical 
approaches suggested to this respect.  We will identify the different positions of authors 
about this subject, and the issues that have been most controvertial among them. 
Once this conceptual precision is concluded we shall enter into the second stage of the 
work to analyse of the individual’s international personality criteria according to the area of 
the International Court of Justice jurisprudence.3
A  complete  study  of  the  international  subjectivity  of  the  individual  in  the  current 
international  practice  would demand not  only an  analysis  of  the International  Court  of 
Justice jurisprudence, but also of the tribunals operating within the universal and regional 
human  rights  protection  systems,4 the  responsability  of  the  individual  in  the  field  of 
2 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J Reports 1949, 
p. 174.
3 We use the concepts of international personality and international subjetivity as synonyms. 
4 The First Optional Protocol to the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Inhuman Punishment, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of  All  Forms of  Racial  Discrimination  and the  Optional  Protocol  to  the  Convention  on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, give to individuals the right to complain about 
violation of the protected rights. “El gran legado del pensamiento jurídico de la segunda mitad del siglo XX,  
mediante la emergencia y evolución del  Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, ha sido a mi  
juicio,  el  rescate del  ser  humano como sujeto del  derecho tanto interno  como internacional,  dotado de 
capacidad jurídica internacional.”- Vote of the Judge A.A. Cancado Trindade, in the Advisory Opinion on 
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants OC-18/03 of September, 17. 2003. Requested 
by the United Mexican states. 
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international criminal law5 and the evolving areas of action of the individuals in the 
sphere  of  international  investments  and  commercial  disputes,  according  to  the 
mechanisms adopted to settle disputes with States (e.g.: ICSID6).
Without prejudice to the reference that this work will make to these last study areas, we 
shall  direct  our  análisis  mainly  to  judgments  and  advisory  opinions  passed  by  the 
International  Court  of Justice  and its  predecessor,  the Permanent  Court  of International 
Justice. We decided to focus the subject on the ICJ, having in mind the significance of its 
jurisprudente for the renewal of the general international law and to innovate in the field of 
doctrine. On the other hand, the limits of this work would be exceeded if a complete study 
were made comprising all fields where the individual has an international role. We will deal 
with this subject in a more limited way and give priority to the impact of jurisprudente for 
the international subjectivity of the individual. 
This  thesis  aims  at  reflecting  the  contribution  of  the  Court  to  the  configuration  of  the 
international subjectivity of the individual, despite the lack of procedural capacity of the 
individual to bring disputes to the ICJ.  
In  the  second and third  chapters  of  this  work,  we will  analyse  two dimensions  of  the 
international personality of the individual before the Court: 
5 In  July 1998, the Statute  for  the establisment of  the International  Criminal  Court  was adopted.  A full 
analysis of the topic would also cover the study of the work done by the tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, 
and the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. “Crimes against  
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who  
commit  such  crimes  can  the  provisions  of  international  law  be  enforced” -  Opening  statement  at  the  
Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor, Justice Robert Jackson. See: Arzt, 
Donna  E:  “Participants  in  international  legal  relations”.  In  volume,  Lori  Fisler  Damrosch:  Beyond 
confrontation. 1995. P. 67. 
6 “Article 1:  (2) The purpose of the Centre (Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) shall be to provide  
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of  
other  Contracting  States  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Convention;  Article  25:  (1)  The 
jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a  
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre  
by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing  
to submit  to the Centre.  When the parties  have given their consent,  no party may withdraw its  consent  
unilaterally. (2)  “National  of  another  Contracting  State”  means:  (a)  any  natural  person  who  had  the  
nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute…but does not include any person  
who on either date also had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute; and (b) any juridical  
person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute /…/” – 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States, submitted 
in Washington, March 18, 1965. Entered in force: October 14, 1966.
5
Firtly, we shall study the individuals as rights-holders and the defense of theirs rights 
before the International Court of Justice. In order to do so, we will mainly refer to the 
diplomatic protection and its evolution under recent judgments of the ICJ. 
Secondly,  in  chapter  three,  we  shall  analyze  the  individual  as  duties-holders  and  the 
question  of  international  responsability.  To  such  effect,  we  will  study  a  series  of 
controverted matters present at the moment of analyzing the responsability of an individual 
for the violation of imperative rules of the international law in cases where individuals act 
as States’ agents. 
This last phenomenon has involved identifiable individuals before the International Court 
of Justice.  And it  has evolved along the  years exposed to  the notable  influence  of  the 
regime of human rights in general international law since the Second World War. To the 
extent that a violation to human rights subject to an international protection regime involves 
a violation to the international law, it could also be brought to the International Court of 
Justice  for  decision,  provided  that  the  all  elements  of  the  ICJ  competente  are  met. 
Considering that international human rights norms grant rights to individuals, it is sound to 
conclude that the international personality of individuals is not indifferent to the ICJ and its 
jurisprudence.  
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CHAPTER I
INDIVIDUALS AND THE CRITERIA FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
PERSONALITY
I.1.   General overview of the evolution of legal doctrines on international 
personality.
An analysis of the evolution of international law until present shows a progressive trend to 
the widen the list of its subjects.7 Originally, in the ideas of the so called “founding fathers” 
of  the  international  law,  Francisco  de  Vitoria,  Francisco  Suárez,  Hugo  Grotius,  the 
existence of a universal community of individuals was sustained and the individual was 
identified as a reference point of rights and duties.8 
Positivist theories flourished later in the XIX Century. These ideas were greatly inspired by 
Hegel´s philosophy, standing out the State figure and leaving the individual on a secondary 
stage.  The  consequence  was  that  the  status  of  subject  of  international  law was  mainly 
reserved for the State. 
States assumed the monopoly of the rights and liabilities in the international area, while 
individuals  depended  completely  on  the  State’s  will,  to  which  they  were  completely 
subjected.9 This stage, is identified with the classical international law, characterized by 
7  “/…/  desde una concepción dinámica del Derecho Internacional, es preciso admitir que éste no conoce  
límites en cuanto a sus sujetos, pues las propias necesidades de la comunidad jurídica internacional en un  
momento dado pueden aconsejar o incluso exigir el investir de personalidad internacional a determinadas  
entidades. Así, al plantearse la cuestión de si las Naciones Unidas poseen o no capacidad para presentar una  
reclamación  internacional  contra  un  Estado/…/”-   Manuel  Diez  de  Velasco  Vallejo:  “Instituciones  de 
Derecho Internacional Público”. Tecnos. Madrid. 1997, p. 213.  In the same sense, Kelsen refered to the 
personal sphere of validity of international law: “/…/ the validity of international law knows no limits” – 
Hans Kelsen: “Principles of International Law”. Second Edition. Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, Inc. 1952, p. 
180.  
8 Francisco  de  Vitoria:  “Relecciones  Teológicas”  (1538-1539);  Francisco  Suarez:  De  Legibus  ac  Deo 
Legislatore (1612); Hugo Grotius: “De jure belli ac pacis” (1625).
9“The State was the God individual man had to serve by self-sacrifice, or, as Hegel put it: The march of God  
in the world, that is what the State is… in the 19 th century and during the first decade of the 20th century, the 
personification  of  the  state  in  international  law ……it  had come  to  be  associated with the  assertion  of  
unlimited rights of  the State  over the individual”-  Nijman,  Janne E:  “The concept  of  international legal 
personality: an inquiry into the history and theory of international law”. Ed. Asser. The Hague. 2004, p. 115.
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interstate  relationships,  where the individual  was not considered as a subject  of the 
international law but as mere object.10  
Brierly has been identified as one of the first authors to  demystify11 the State’s qualities, 
advancing an idea of the State, not as a person with its own and superior will, but as an 
institution.12 Kelsen, on the other hand, had a purely normative concept of the State: “The 
juristic person as an entity  different  from the so-called natural or physical person,  the  
human individual, is a auxiliary concept of juristic thinking, an instrument of legal theory,  
the purpose of which is to simplify the description of legal phenomena…The state as a  
juristic person is the personification of a legal order constituting a legal community…The  
state as a community is not a biological, psychological, or sociological unit; it is, as a  
legal community, a specifically juristic unity.”13 This conception of the State leads to an 
approach  where  its  powers  are  limited  so  a  revaluation  of  the  individual  is  rendered 
possible. 
Among authors who considered the States where the only subjects  of international law, 
Anzilotti,  Strupp and Triepel  can be mentioned.14 A different  perspective was taken by 
10“Lamentablemente, las reflexiones y la visión de los llamados fundadores del derecho internacional, que lo  
concebían como un sistema verdaderamente universal, vinieron a ser suplantadas por la emergencia del  
positivismo jurídico, que sobre todo a partir del siglo XIX, personificó el Estado dotándolo de “voluntad  
propia”,  reduciendo  los  derechos  de  los  seres  humanos  a  los  que  el  Estado  a  éstos  “concedía”.  El  
consentimiento o la “voluntad” de los Estados (el positivismo voluntarista) se tornó el criterio predominante  
en el  derecho internacional,  negando jus standi a los individuos,  a los seres humanos. Esto dificultó la  
comprensión de la sociedad internacional, y debilitó el propio Derecho Internacional, reduciéndolo a un  
derecho interestatal, no más por encima sino entre Estados soberanos”- Vote of the Judge A.A. Cancado 
Trindade, in the Advisory Opinion on Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants OC-
18/03 of September, 17. 2003. Requested by the United Mexican states. 
11 Nijman, Janne E: “The concept of international legal personality: an inquiry into the history and theory of 
international law”. Ed. Asser. The Hague. 2004.
12“/…/ (Brierly) reduced the importance of the state and emphasized the significance of individual personality 
/…/”- Nijman, Janne E: “The concept of international legal personality: an inquiry into the history and theory 
of international law”. The Hague. Ed. Asser. 2004, pp. 138 – 146.
13 Kelsen, H: “Principles of International Law”. Second Edition. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. EEUU, 
1966 pp. 181 -183.
14“/…/  “It  is  unthinkable”  said  Anzilotti  that  there  may  exist  any  subjects  of  international  rights  and  
obligations other than the States”.-  Criton G. Tornaritis, Q.C.: “The Individual as a Subject of International 
law”. Nicosia, 1972, p. 17.
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Scelle wo supported the international personality of individuals, highlighting that only 
individuals merited that status.15 
The first  important  exception  to  the thesis  that  international  law only allotted  rights to 
soverign States, came with the creation of the International Labor Organization (I.L.O), in 
1919. With the acknowledgment of rights to workers, this organization would become a 
foundational step towards a universal system of human rights protection. 
With the end of the Second World War, the creation of the United Nations concurred with 
the search for the establishment  of  a  worldwide system to project  the human rights of 
individuals, overcoming the vesting of dominating political and legal theories of the time. 
New actors appeared in the international scenario: The number of States grew together with 
the  decolonization  processes  and  the  international  personality  of  International 
Organizations  was  fully  acknowledged.16 The  latter  has  been  granted  with  limited  or 
functional purposes, subjecting it to the frame of the statute or constitutive instrument:
“/…/ the Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising  
and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the  
possession  of  a  large  measure  of  international  personality  and  the  capacity  to  
operate upon an international plane.”17
The admission of different actors in the international community breaks with the tradition 
of the classical international law, and the monopoly exercised by States. This implies that 
the doctrine had to start determining criteria for an international personality differentiating 
from those present  in  the statehood.  In classical  international  law only the States  were 
15 Scelle, Georges: “Précis de Droit des Gens. Principes et Systématique. Première Partie”. Paris: Recueil 
Sirey, 1932. 
16 “/…/ it may be noted that in 1899 at the First Hague Peace Conference only 26 States were represented.  
This number was increased to 44 at the Second Hague Conference in 1907. The League of Nations had a 
representation  of  45 original  members  with  an  addition of  five  (Afqhanistan,  Egypt,  Ethiopia,  Irag  and  
Turkey)  who subsequently  joined  the  Organization.  The  United  Nations,  on  the  other  hand,  which  was  
founded in 1946 with 51 original members has already expanded to 159, and continues to expand steadily b  
the increasing claim of  legal sovereignty by the dependent  territories”.- Menon,  P. K: “The Subjects  of  
Modern International Law”. Hague, YIL, 3 (1990), p. 30.
17 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J Reports 1949, 
p. 174.
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subjects of the international law. Accordingly, to be a subject of the international law it 
had to be a State, which on its turn fulfilled the requirements to enjoy an international 
personality.18 
With the widening of the categories of subjects of international law, led by the creation of 
international organizations possessing international capacity,  issues relating to the criteria 
of  an international  personality  began to  differentiate  from the  criteria  applicable  to  the 
statehood;19
 “The Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international  
person. That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which is certainly is  
not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a  
State. Still less is it the same thing as saying that it is a “super-State”, whatever  
that expression may mean. It does not even imply that all its rights and duties must  
be upon the international plane, any more than all the rights and duties of a State  
must be upon that plane.”20
Moreover, with the human rights protection systems a renewed impulse was given to the 
consideration of the individual as subject of international law. These systems should grant 
direct rights to individuals, but caution must be employed in the analysis of the mechanisms 
established to defend individuals’ rights. 
Currently, an important participation of the individual in the international arena can be seen 
throught  its  acting  before  human  rights  organizations,  international  criminal  courts  and 
international  institutions  for the settlement  of disputes in investment  matters.  The trend 
towards  the acknowledgement  of  an international  subjectivity  would  seem in  this  way, 
favorable. 
18 “The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent  
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the others  
States”. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1.  (Emphasis 
added)
19 If we only consider as subjects of international law to those who meet all the elements and characteristics 
of States, would be impossible to conceive as subjects of international law to any other entity than States.  
20 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J Reports 1949, 
p. 174.
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I. 2. The criteria required for the international personality
 “[T]he jurist is free to adopt the concept of subject he whishes; only,  
he must be consequent with it in its depscrition of the law.” 21 
It may be said without fear of making a mistake that the study of the subjectivity or the 
international personality, shows like in other spheres of theory, the different conceptions of 
international law which have existed through history. 
As of the first use of the term, which according to a research carried out by Nijman dates 
from  Leibniz,22 the  authors  have  theorized  about  the  hierarchy  of  the  international 
personality and the similarities and differences among them. Some authors have intended 
that, with the acceptance of a certain entity as subjects of international law an acting space 
would be recognized to this entity in the international arena.23  
From which  an  opposite  process  is  produced:  Instead  of  determining  the  international 
subjectivity  on the base of  the existent  juridical  reality,  international  subjectivity  of  an 
entity is proposed to acknowledge to it a specific space of action. This is due to a mistaken 
21 “/…/ el jurista es libre de adoptar el concepto de sujeto que desee; sólo debe ser consecuente con él en su  
descripción del derecho.” - Barberis, Julio A: “Los Sujetos del Derecho Internacional Actual”. Buenos Aires. 
1984, p. 24.  
22 “Leibniz  was the first  writer  to use the term “international  legal person” – or rather  “persona jure  
gentium” – and he included it in the Praefatio to his Codex Iuris Gentium diplomaticus (1963).” Nijman, 
Janne E: “The concept of international legal personality: an inquiry into the history and theory of international 
law”. The Hague. 2004, p. 29.
23 “Considering Leibniz desire to limit the arbitrary use of power and his intention to encapsulate all power  
in the universal natural law system, International Legal Personality was used to confirm and capture in a  
legal notion the ruler´s subjection to the law of nations. It was used to give sovereignty a counterpart in  
responsibility. Sovereignty was thus not only relative in the sense that it applied to those with a sufficient  
degree  of  force  and  related  competences,  but  also  in  the  sense  that  sovereign  powers  were  externally  
restricted by the law of nations. By having International Legal Personality, rulers not only had powers or  
rights,  but  also the legal  responsibility  to  use  their  authority  in  accordance  with the  law of  nations  as  
springing from justice. Those who possessed international personality had international powers, such as the  
right to wage war, the right to conclude treaties and the right to conduct international relations, but  they  
also had the duty to use these rights in conformity with the law of nature and of nations. Consequently, the  
use of power was contained by law and any abusive,  corrupt or arbitrary use of  power was (in theory)  
prevented. By subjecting the sovereign powers to the ius natural et gentium they were obliged to use their  
power and authority justly; it legitimized their power and authority.” - Nijman, Janne E:  “The concept of  
international legal personality:  an inquiry into the history and theory of international law”.  The Hague. 
2004. p. 79.
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use of the international subjectivity, which disqualifies it as a proper tool of the science 
of law. International subjectivity of a specific entity, must be the consequence of the 
juridical  reality  described according to the criterion which,  correctly  specified,  is  to be 
used. 
When the international subjectivity is not derived from a descriptive qualification, it may 
exceed  the  characteristics  of  the  legal  theory  and  turn  to  political  philosophy  or 
international relations. 
Thence,  the  categorization  of  the  international  personality  must  be  understood  as  a 
consequence of the international juridical reality described, based on a specific criterion, 
responding coherently to the description of international law as a system.24 It is a fiction or 
an entelechy which eases the comprehension of the law. 
From the study of the different conceptions on the international personality, it would seem 
utopist to develop a doctrine which could be able to exhaust all the criteria which determine 
the international personality of a subject. 
Certainly,  as we stated before,  there  will  be not  rule  based on international  law which 
states: The following entities are subjects of the international law proceeding then to enlist 
them. Or a rule which would directly state the requirements that a subject to international 
law must have.
The  criteria  which  specify  the  existente  of  the  international  personality  may  change 
according to the authors’ approaches. Although it may appear to be certain uniformity in 
respect of the requirements so as the individuals is entitled to rights and duties becoming a 
subject of the law, there is not coincidence among authors with respect to the scope of said 
entitlement. The same discrepancy is shown in relation to access to international courts or 
24 “(1) International law as a legal system: International law is a legal system. Its rules and principles (i.e. its  
norms) act in relation to and should be interpreted against the background of other rules and principles. As a 
legal system, international law is not a random collection of such norms. There are meaningful relationships  
between them. Norms may thus exist at higher and lower hierarchical levels, their formulation may involve  
greater or lesser generality and specificity and their validity may date back to earlier or later moments in  
time” - Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
arising  from the  Diversification  and  Expansion  of  International  Law,  Adopted  by  the  International  Law 
Commission at its Fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the General  Assembly as a part of the 
Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/61/10, parr. 251).  
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organizations to invoke rights and to be held responsible for duties, not to mention the 
possible participation in the law-creation process.25 Despite the issue of participation in 
the law-creation process of international norms may appear, for example, as a determining 
criterion of the personality,26 authors as Diez de Verdasco and Cançado Trindade take a 
different view. Diez de Velasco says that: “[T]he contents of the international personality,  
in terms of capacity, is not the same in all subjects, so, for example, it would be wrong deny  
the  status  of  subject  of  international  law  of  the  individual,  on  the  only  base  of  his  
incapacity to participate in processes of creation of international law”,27 Cançado Trindade 
states that:“(e)arlier attempts to deny to individuals the condition of being a subject of  
international law on the ground that individuals lack some of the capacities which States  
have (such as, e.g. that of treaty-making), are definitively devoid of any meaning. At the  
domestic law level, not all individuals participate, directly or indirectly, in the law-making  
process,  yet  they  do not  thereby  cease to  be subjects  of  law.  The doctrinal  trend that  
attempts to insist on such a rigid definition of international subjectivity and that makes  
subjectivity conditional on the very formation of international norms and compliance with  
them, simply does not sustain itself. This argument cannot even be sustained at the level of  
domestic  law,  in  which  it  is  not  required  (and it  never  has  been)  that  all  individuals  
participate  in  the  creation  and application  of  the  legal  norms in  order  to  be  subjects  
(titulaires) of rights and to be bound by the duties emanating from such norms.”28
25“Currently, however, individuals are widely recognized as subjects of international law. One question that  
arises logically from this recognition is if effect on the power of individuals to make international law, and  
specifically  on  their  power  to  participate  in  the  formation  of  customary  international  law./…/.”  Ochoa 
Christiana: “The Individual and Customary International Law Formation.” Indiana University School of Law 
Bloomington, Legal Studies Research Paper Number 75. March 2007, p. 122.
26“/…/Rather than concentrating on the formal problem of what is a “subject” of international law, or who  
should enjoy “international legal personality”, we ask more functional questions: Who should – and who, in  
effect,  already  does  – enjoy  rights  and  obligations  under  international  law? Who should –  and does  –  
actually  participate in the process  of  creating, making claims under,  and enforcing international law?”- 
Arzt,  Donna E:  “Participants  in  international  legal  relations”.  In  volume Damrosch,  Lori  Fisler:  Beyond 
confrontation. 1995. p. 62
27 “/…/ el contenido de la personalidad internacional, en términos de capacidad, no es el mismo en todos los  
sujetos, de modo que, por ejemplo, no sería correcto negar la condición de sujeto del Derecho Internacional  
al  individuo basándose sólo en  su incapacidad para participar  en los  procesos de creación  de  normas  
jurídicas  internacionales”-   Manuel  Diez  de  Velasco  Vallejo:  Instituciones  de  Derecho  Internacional 
Público”. Tecnos. Madrid. 1997. p. 215.
28 Cancado  Trindade,  Antônio  Augusto:  “The  Emancipation  of  the  individual  from his  own  State:  The  
Historical Recovery of the Human Person as Subject of the Law of Nations”.  Human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law. 2007, p. 156. “/…/ la capacidad de participar en la elaboración de normas internacionales y  
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In the Reparation for Injuries case, the International Court of Justice pointed out to the 
fact that there were different to assess the existente of a subject of law in a complex 
international community: 
“The subjects  of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in  
their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends on  the 
needs  of  the  community.  Throughout  its  history,  the  development  of  
international law has been influenced by the requirements of international  
life,  and the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has  
already given  rise  to  instantes  of  action  upon the international  plane by  
certain entibies which are not States /…/.”29
As I have already mentioned, the subjectivity under international law may be object of an 
analysis of political science and philosophy. However, as Barberis states, referring to the 
individual subjectivity: “In international law, the theme of the private person as a subject  
is not related to a philosophical analysis about the human being, it is rather more simple to  
examine the legal technical question to determine whether the international order contains  
norms that establish rights and duties intended to apply directly to private persons.” 30
This sentence does not only give a conceptual precision, but it is also  a guidance to this 
work where we will consider the international subjectivity from a descriptive perspective. 
The task of finding the necessary legal precision is not easy. Let’s examen for example a 
simple definition as the one suggested by Verdross. He defines as subjects of international 
law as “/…/ those persons whose behavior is directly regulated by the international law.”31
la aptitud para prevalerse directamente de ellas,  no vendrían a constituir caracteres  necesarios  para la 
asignación  de  subjetividad  jurídica  internacional”  –  Moncayo,  Vinuesa,  Gutiérrez  Posse:  Derecho  
Internacional Público. Tomo I. Ed. Zavalia. Buenos Aires. 1999, p. 16.
29 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J Reports 1949, 
p. 174. pp. 178-179.
30 “En el  derecho de gentes, el tema de la persona privada como sujeto no se relaciona con el análisis  
filosófico del ser humano, sino que se trata de algo más simple: el examen de un cuestión de técnica jurídica  
para determinar si el ordenamiento internacional contiene normas que establecen derecho u obligaciones  
cuyos  destinatarios  directos  son  personas  privadas”- Barberis,  Juli  A:  “Los  Sujetos  del  Derecho 
Internacional Actual”. Buenos Aires.  1984, p. 160.
31 “/…/  aquellas  personas  cuyo  comportamiento  regula  directamente  el  orden  juridico  internacional” - 
Verdross, Alfred: “Derecho Internacional Público” 5ta Ed. Traducción de Antonio Truyol y Serra. 1982.  p. 
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The  author  uses a  qualifying  adjective  to  refer  to  the  regulation  made  by  the 
international law: it must be direct. This means that there may be subjects regulated 
either directly or indirectly by international law, but only the former would be subjects of 
international  law.   However  before  analyzing  this  approach  focused  on  the  difference 
between direct and indirect regulation, we must ask: what would the regulation of behavior 
by the international  law consist of? This paper understand that the term “regulation” is 
translated in the sense of be rights or duties held by a person in a juridical system. 
Whats  does it  mean to be a right or duty holder? Does it  mean having access to legal 
remedies  under  international  legal  system  and  an  entitlement  to  stand  befote  an 
international  court  or  tribunal?  Can  the  exercise  of  actions  before  international 
organizations  be  accepted  as  criteria  to  be  a  rights-holder?  To  be  a  right-holder,  is  it 
necessary to have the capacity to enforce a judgment passed in a case where the individual 
was a party? 
These matters may be originated in two compartive approaches: first, the approach referred 
to the situation of the individual and the State before international law; and secondly, the 
approach referred to the situation of the individual before the international law and before 
the domestic law. For example, if the analysis of the capacity to enforce the judgment of an 
international court is made, it will be clearly seen that it is a issue of comparative studies 
devoted  to  the  individual  before  domestic  and  international  law.  That  because,  the 
weaknesses in the capacity to enforce international law, is a common issue between subject 
of international law, and as such it is not expressed as a valuable distinction criteria in 
international law between individuals and States. 
The participation of the individual as a subject of international law, on the other hand, has 
been historically related to the consular and diplomatic protection, which implies different 
issues and problems. Among the most relevant ones there is the rule of nationality of the 
person who claims against a State and the consular protection of the nationals. This work 
will go back to this matter extensively in the following chapter to analyse the decisions of 
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the International Court of Justice in LaGrand32 and Avena33 cases. At this stage, I will 
introduce these issues to analyse the concept of a rights-holder. 
In the Mavrommatis case, the Permanent Court of International Justice, specified the main 
characteristics of diplomatic protection:  
“By taking up the case of one of its subjects and resorting to diplomatic  
action  or  international  judicial  proceedings  on  this  behalf,  a  State  is  in  
reality  asserting its  own rights – its  right to ensure,  in the person of its  
subjects, respect for the rules of international law. The question, therefore,  
whether  the  present  dispute  originates  in  an injury to  a  private  interest,  
which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant  
form this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its  
subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is  
the sole claimant.”34 
The decision is indicative of the classical frames of diplomatic protection as an institution 
of  international  law  conceived  as  an  inter-State  order.  In  this  sense,  the  diplomatic 
protection only allows the effective protection of rights or interests of the individuals under 
the legal fiction of considering them as interests or rights of the State that exercises the 
diplomatic protection. 
This lack of independence between the action of the individual who may claim the breach 
of their rights founded in the international law, and the action of the State whose nationality 
32 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of América), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2001, p. 466.
33 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 
p. 12
34 Mavrommatis Case, PCIJ Series A, No.2, Judgment of 30 August 1924, p. 12.
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they enjoy, characterizes the debate about the individual as a subject of the international 
law.  There  is:  the  dissociation  between  the  entitlement  (titularidad) of  rights  and  the 
mechanisms that the international law provides to act in their defense. 
This circumstance has not prevented authors from considering individuals as subjects of 
international law. In this sense, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht stated in its work on International 
Law and Human Rights:35“The position of the individuals as a subject of international law  
has often been obscured by the failure to observe the distinction between the recognition,  
in an international instrument of rights ensuring to the benefit of the individual and the  
enforceability of these rights at his instance. The fact that the beneficiary of rights is not  
authorized to take independent steps in his own name to enforce them does not signify that  
he is not a subject of the law or that the rights in question are vested exclusively in the  
agency which possesses the capacity to enforce them. Thus in relation to the current view 
that the rights of the alien within foreign territory are the rights of his state and not his  
own, the correct  way of  stating the legal  position  is  not  that  the state  asserts  its  own 
exclusive right but that it enforces, in substance, the right of the individual who, as the law  
now stands, is incapable of asserting it in the international sphere.”
In an opposite position Kelsen referred to:“/…/ (T)he view that seeks to effect a distinction  
between the procedural capacity of individuals and their status as subjects of international  
rights obscures this  normal pattern of  international  law by the tendency  to  identify  as 
rights any interests of individuals that are somehow protected by international law.”36 
35 Lauterpacht,  H: “International Law and Human Rights”. London (1950), p. 27.
36 Kelsen, H: “Principles of International  law”. Second Edition. Holt, Rinehart  and Winston, Inc.  EEUU, 
1966, p. 232
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The rights that individuals enjoy at the international level, on the basis of  treaties may 
have three ways of being exerciced: a) a claim by an individual before national courts, 
when the rights acknowledged to the individual by a treaty have been incorporated in the 
domestic law; b) the claim by the State of the nationality of an individual by means of the 
diplomatic protection, which means that the State makes a claim based on the breach of a 
rule that protect its own rights, and c) the claim by an individual who invokes a treaty that 
grants a right and the possibility to have a direct access to an international court. 
In the context of human rights, the right to have direct access to an international court, is 
contemplated in the European human rights protection system. In this sense the European 
Convention on Human Rights of 1950, following the reform of Protocol XI of 1998 states 
in article 34 that:“Individual applications. The Court may receive applications from any  
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of  
a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention  
or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way 
the effective exercise of this right.”
On the other hand, the duties-holder concept in international law is directly related to the 
development  of  principles  and  rules  about  the  responsability  of  the  individual  before 
international courts. Piracy,37 slavery and genocide as crimes against  humanity38 are the 
most prominent examples identified as sources of responsability of the individual under 
international law. The Nuremberg tribunal stated on the particular:  
37 “Article 101: Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or  
any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a  
private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or  
property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside  
the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft  
with  knowledge  of  facts  making  it  a  pirate  ship  or  aircraft;  (c)  any  act  of  inciting  or  of  intentionally  
facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)”. - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982.
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“The very essence of the Charter (of the International Military Tribunal) is that  
individuals have international duties  which transcend the national obligations of  
obedience imposed by the individual State. He who violates the laws of war cannot  
obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the State  
in  authorizing action  moves  outside  its  competence  under  international  law.” 39 
(Emphasis added) 
The U.S. Chief Prosecutor, Justice Robert Jackson stated at the same time: “Crimes against  
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing  
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”40
In  Verdross’  definition  it  is  apparent  that  the  author  refers  to  the  direct  and  indirect 
regulation by the international law. Subject of international law, in this criteria, are only 
them who are directly regulated by it. Barberis proposes a similar definition of international 
subjectivity:  "/.../ it will be considered as a subject of international law, to anyone whose 
conduct is provided directly by the law of nations, at least, as the content of a right or  
duty" and about the direct regulation refers: "/.../ it must be analysed in more detail what is  
meant being direct recipient of an international norms that provide a right or imposes a  
38 “Article 4: Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be  
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”  
–Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  The 1996 Draft Code of 
the  International  Law  Commission  provides  individual  responsibility  with  regard  to  genocide, 
aggression,  crime against  humanity,  war  crimes  and  crime against  United  Nations  and  associated 
personnel. See. E.g. Shaw, Malcolm N: “International Law”. Fifth Ed. Cambrige 2003, pp 232 -241.
39 Before Resolution 95 of the United Nations General Assembly of 1946, the rules of the Nuremberg Charter 
and the decision of  the Tribunal are part of International Law. 
40 Opening statement at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals. See Arzt, Donna E: “Participants 
in international legal relations”. In volume Damrosch, Lori Fisler: Beyond confrontation. 1995. P. 67. It has 
also emphasized the expansion of individual activity in the field of international criminal law: “/../the number 
of  specific  international  crimes that  can be committed by private individuals has increased  form earlier  
categories to include, among others, the following: genocide; other crimes against humanity; apartheid; race  
discrimination;  hostage-taking;  torture;  forced  disappearance  of  persons;  terrorism;  terrorist  bombings;  
financing of terrorism; aircraft hi-jacking; aircraft sabotage and certain other acts against civil aviation;  
certain acts against the safety of maritime navigation, including boatjacking; murder, kidnapping, or other  
attacks on the person or liberty of internationally protected persons; trafficking in certain drugs; slavery; and  
mercenarism”.- Paust, Jordan J.: The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International 
Legal Process”, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, p. 1240.
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duty. The holder of a right or obligation may not be who appear as such in the letter of  
a  treaty,  but  who  actually  enforces  the right  or  assumes  the  duty.  If  an 
organization appears as duty-holder or interntional right-holder by a treaty, but this duty  
or  this  right is  effectively assumed  by  another  entity,  the first  will  lack  international  
personality and shall be taken only as an organ of the latter, which is the real international  
subject.”41
The diversity in rights and duties that different entities hold in the international community, 
has raised issues of international law. Along this line, it is common to direct the discusión 
towards the privileged position that the States enjoy in international law, and to compare 
the  individuals  against  this  situation.  The  great  disputes  in  formulating  the  concept  of 
international subjectivity, do not end unfortunately with the election of one or other criteria, 
but in the way authors consider they have fulfilled their goals. Verdross’s definition about 
the international personality based on direct regulation, includes a criterion which allows 
the distinction between complete and partial subjects. 
As this study specified it before, there are probably no major justifications to deny the 
quality of subjects of international law to those who are directly regulated by it, or not to 
consider  as  subjects  of  international  law  both,  those  who  are  regulated  directly  and 
indirectly. The different criteria derive from the theoretical characterization of international 
law as a clear and practical system. The election of a definition depends of the exclusive 
intention of each author. Therefore, there is not, a priori, an approach better or worse than 
another. What seems more important is the utility and clarity of the postulate. 
A different  criterion on the concept of subjectivity  in international  law is  suggested by 
Rosalyin  Higgins.  The  author  adopts  a  different  approach  and  revises  the  tradicional 
concept  of  subject  of  international  law.  She  advocates  for  a  conceptual  definition  of 
41 “/…/ se considera sujeto de derecho internacional a todo aquel cuya conducta está prevista directamente  
por el derecho de gentes, al menos, como contenido de un derecho o de una obligación /…/ se debe analizar 
más detalladamente qué se entiende por ser destinatario directo de una norma internacional que otorga un  
derecho o impone una obligación. El titular del derecho u obligación puede no ser quien figura como tal en  
la letra de un tratado, sino que es quien efectivamente hace valer el derecho o asume la obligación. Si una  
organización aparece como titular de una obligación o de un derecho internacional de un tratado, pero esa  
obligación  o  ese  derecho  es  efectivamente  asumido  por  otro  ente,  aquélla  carecerá  de  personalidad 
internacional y será tenida solo como un órgano de este último, que será el verdadero sujeto internacional)”  
-  Barberis, Juli A: “Los Sujetos del Derecho Internacional Actual” Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. 1984 , p. 25
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international  law  as  a  “decisión-making  process”,  therefore,  one  should  not  find 
subjects or objects but  “participants in the international legal system”: 
“It  is  more  helpful,  and  closer  to  perceived  reality,  to  return  to  the  view  of  
international  law  as  a  particular  decision-making  process.  Within  that  process  
(which is a dynamic and not a static one) there are a variety of participants, making 
claims  across  state  lines,  with  the  object  of  maximizing  various  values.  
Determinations  will  be made on those claims by various  authoritative  decision-
makers –Foreign Office Legal Advisers, arbitrary tribunals, courts.  Now, in this 
model, there are no “subjects” and “objects”, but only participants. Individuals are  
participants,  along  with  states,  international  organizations  (such  as  the  United  
Nations,  or  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  or  the  ILO),  multinational  
corporations, and indeed private non-governmental groups.”42 
Higgins  rejects  the positivist school’s approach to international law as a set of rules, and 
considers it a “decision making processes”, in the sense conceived by McDougal, Chen, 
and Lasswell. She concludes that there are no subjects or objects of international law, but 
participants, this implies the possibility that individuals being considered in such quality. 
This  work  does  not  pretend  to  introduce  a  critical  analysis  of  the  proposed  category. 
However, it must be said that the category of “participants” is understandable in the context 
of a doctrinary construction which tries to give coherence to a determined conception of 
international  law. Probably,  the answer may result  in  a vague category  of  “subjects  of 
international law” where a fine work of differentiation among the possible “participants” is 
necessary. 
There  is,  however,  another  point  in  the  study  of  the  international  subjectivity  which 
deserves attention. Going back to the definition which gave place to our analysis: “subjects 
of international law are those persons who are directly regulate by the international law”,43 
42 Higginis, R.:  “Problems and process: International Law and how we use it”.  Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1994, p. 50.  
43 Verdross, Alfred: Derecho International Publico, 5ta Ed. Translation of Antonio Truyol y Serra. 1982, p. 
174. 
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or consider as such “/…/ to all those whose conduct is directly subject to international  
law, at least, as the content of a right or an obligation.”44
These  definitions  highlight the  juridical  element  of  the  category:  the  regulation  or  the 
preview of behaviour by the  international law.  To this respect, there is another element 
which is worth mentioning at this stage. Due to the fact, that the mere direct regulation by 
international  law  would  not  be  enough  to  create  a  subject  of  international  law,  to 
distinguish from an object, the existence of a person, a subject, entitled to claim rights and 
to comply with duties imponed by international law, is necessary.45
Which are the elements that characterize to a subject? The debate around this study favours 
to individuals as well as States. There is no doubt that the individual may fulfills the criteria 
of being “subject”, enjoying capacity for holding rights and duties. The controversial point 
for their consideration as subjects of international law, in any case, is the lack of direct 
regulation by the international law or the precarious quality of the rights acknowledged to 
them, but not their previous condition as subject.  In the case of States,  there is no doubt 
that they enjoy rights and hold duties directly regulated by international law, and that the 
concept or idea of State contains in itself the identification of an autonomous will, with 
inherente  capacity  to  bear  duties  and to  enjoy  rights.  Now,  the  debate  regarding  it,  is 
identifying in which situations we refers to State, and as such, when we refers to “subject”, 
to determine in that previous precision its potentiallity as subject of International Law by 
means of the direct  regulation  for this  system. The same happens to  situations  such as 
international organizations, belligerent groups, National Liberation Movements, NGOs, and 
other sui generis cases where the debate is about the capacity or potencial ability to behave 
as “subject” under general or special international legal frameworks. 
However, it can be difficult  to explain international subjectivity without referring to the 
regulation of international law. Effectively, as these cases are fictions created by the law, 
the will, and the regulation are closely related. This is because, a will can be difficult be 
44 “/…/ a todo aquel cuya conducta esta prevista directamente por el derecho de gentes, al menos, como  
contenido  de  un derecho o de  una  obligacion”Barberis,  Juli  A:  “Los  Sujetos  del  Derecho  Internacional 
Actual” Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. 1984, p. 25.
45 “No one can be the subject of a legal norm unless he is either an individual or a juristic person whilst the 
object of a norm may also be inanimate things” -  Criton G. Tornaritis, Q.C.: “The Individual as a Subject of 
International Law”. Nicosia, 1972, p. 16.
22
thought  without  the  regulation  of  the  law.  It  may  seem easy  to  consider  that  this 
reasoning supposes a circular analysis.46
Although it could be thought from a philosophical or logical point of view in a hypothetical 
scenary that intended to give the law a later stage in regulation of a conduct which appeared 
at the beginning as the expression of a will not juridically categorized, in the analysis from 
the point of view of the law, the simultaniety between both, will and regulation,  seems 
unavoidable. That is, because a will shall only have juridical effect if it is regulate by law.  
It is in this plane where, in our opinion, it is exposed the idea of by Acquaviva for the 
identification of subjects of the international law. 
The author expresses: “/…/for an entity to be considered a subject of international law, the  
entity must be able to assert effectively that it is not subordinate to another authority; in  
other words, it  must have the ability not to recognize any entity  as a superior. Such a 
status-defined as sovereignty- is established through the analysis of that entity´s powers  
within the entity itself and, under certain circumstances, of its relations with other subjects 
of  international  law…in other  words,  subjects  of  international  law were  those  entities  
superiorem non recognoscentes, able not to recognize any superior within the international  
community. This feature is at the basis of the fact that the international community is not  
structured as a hierarchical society, but rather as a community of (formal) peers.”47
The attribution of personality under international law only to those entities which do not 
acknowledge a superior authority links this doctrine directly with the theory of international 
responsability. This is a domain in which international law has clearly shown an evolution 
in favor of the direct responsability of the individual. Acquaviva’s theory emphasizes the 
importante  of  the  concept  of  international  responsability  for  the  existence  of  an 
international subjectivity and the relevant characteristic of any subject which is not being 
subject to one another: 
46 “/…/ is an entity capable of possessing international rights and duties and having the capacity to maintain 
its rights by bringing international claims. This definition, though conventional, is unfortunately circular since 
the indicia referred to depend on the existence of a legal person”-  Ian Brownlie, refering to the concept of 
subject of International Law in: “Principles of Public International Law”. 6th Edition. 0xford. 2003, p.47
47 Acquaviva, G: “Subject of International Law: A Power-Based Analysis”. Vanderbuilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 3 (2005), pp. 345-396.
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“One of the ways to gather evidence on effective authority by a subject is to shift the  
attention  from  issues  of  personality  to  issues  of  responsibility…An  entity  is  not  
ultimately responsible when it is dependent on another to act, when it is not genuinely in  
control of its decisions, or when it derives its existence and powers for another entity´s  
authority. For the purposes of international law, it is not a subject.”48
This  study has  already  introduced  the  different  elements  which  are part  of  the  debate 
around the international  subjectiviy.  Reviewing them, it  is  possible  to identify different 
degrees of subjectivity:
1°- The existence of rights and duties granted by international law to a subject;
 2°- Procedural capacity to claim rights or to be held responsible by international courts for 
infringement of international duties; 
3°- Enforcement of a judgment or resolution passed by an international tribunal or court;
4° - Participation in the process of creation of  international law. 
As a summarial analysis of the doctrine shows, it is apparent that international law authors 
sustain different positions regarding the above mentioned categories and criteria. It can also 
be perceived that the acceptance of an international subjectivity of the individual in regimes 
of human rights has not been transposed to other spheres of international law. Therefore, it 
seems  important  to  take  into  account  the  contribution  made  by  the  international 
jurisprudence from a not formalistic perpective to the characterization of international law 
subjects, and it relation to the role of the individual. 
48“The best way to understand if an entity is really superirem non recognoscens and if it is indeed a subject  
of international law (whether the international community agrees to calling it “state” or not) is the fact that  
breaches emananting from its “organs” – considered in the broadest terms – are imputed to that entity, and  
not to others. Thus, although from a logical standpoint personality comes before responsibility, the latter is a  
means  to  carry  out  the  complex  empirical  analysis  needed  to  establish  whether  an entity  is  sovereign” 
Acquaviva,  G:  “Subject  of  International  Law:  A  Power-Based  Analysis”.  Vanderbuilt  Journal  of 
Transnational Law 3 (2005), P. 46-49. The idea of states international responsability to determine the effects 
of  the  international  personality  is  also  expresed  on  other  terms in  Eustathiades  y  Wengler,  see  e.g. 
Eusthatiades,  Constantin:  “Les  sujets  du  droit  international  et  la  responsabilité  international,  Nouvelles  
tendances”, Recueil des Cours de la Académie de Droit International, vol. 84, 1953- III. 
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CHAPTER II
INDIVIDUALS AS RIGHT-HOLDERS AND THE DEFENS OF THEIR   RIGHTS  
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE   
II.1 Active dimension of the international personality of the individual before the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and International Court of Justice
The Statute of the International Court of Justice establishes:  
Competence of the Court. Art. 34:
“1. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court /…/” 
The possibility that the individual should be a party to in disputes before the International 
Court of Justice is not a new debate, as the following quotation indicates:  
“The Committee of Jurist appointed by the League of Nations to draft the Statute of  
the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920 considered the question of  
conferring upon individuals the procedural capacity for action before the Court.  
Porfessors  Loder  and  De  Lapradelle  supported  allowing  individuals  as  parties  
before the Court, but both jurists met with strong opposition on this point”.49 
Procedurally, the capacity of individual before the Court is currently limited to the role of 
witness or expert in particular cases.  
Without prejudice to this rather limited role in interstate controversias, on several occasions 
the Court has been requested to decide on a dispute referring to the rights and duties which 
in  accordance  with  the  international  legal  order  are  directly  related  to  the  status  of 
individuals.50 In  conjunction  with  the development  of  human rights  regimes,  the above 
49 Menon, P.K: “The Subjects of Modern International Law”, Hague Yearbook of International Law. 1990. p. 
64.
50“Human rights issues, or other legal issues related to the rights of individuals, may appear among the  
claims or arguments by states appearing before the ICJ in contentious cases. As a classic case, reference can  
be made to the Nottebohm case which largely concerned the nationality of one named individual.” -  Martin 
Scheinin: “The ICJ and the Individual” International Community Law Review 9 (2007) p. 125.
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mentioned  situation  has  occurred  in  cases  where  international  law  accords  a  legal 
protection or privilege directly applicable to an individual for his function or position. 
The study of the judgments passed by the PCIJ or the ICJ intends to show the evolution of 
this matter within the international law framework, starting from the first decisions of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice denied the possibility that the international legal 
order  granted  directly  rights  and  duties  to  individuals,  and  ending  by  the  most  recent 
jurisprudence of the Court where such a situation is accepted. 
The second point to be addressed in this chapter refers to the evolution occured in the field 
of the diplomatic protection. According to the analysis of the previous chapter, one of the 
criterion  of  the  international  personality  sustained  by  the  doctrine  corresponded  to  the 
procedural capacity to claim in international stages. The Statute of the International Court 
of Justice precludes such capacity in the case of individuals. Therefore, from statutory point 
of view, individual are not entitled to access to the ICJ.
To this respect, some doctrinary positions sustain that in recent decision of the International 
Court  of  Justice,  the  applicable  criteria  to  the  subjectivity  of  the  individuals  are  being 
flexibilized  indirectly  by  means  of  the  recourse  to  the  diplomatic  protection.  This 
phenomenon remains to be studied in depth so as to determine whether there is a trend in 
favor of an ackowledgement of the international personality of the individual. Therefore, it 
is interesting to assess whether the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice is 
receptive to new criteria of international subjectivity. 
To provide answers to these questions,  this  thesis will  start  studying some decisions or 
opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice.   
II. 2. Select Judgments and Advisory Opinions
The jugdments and advisory opinions to be analyzed have been selected according to their 
relationship with the subject-matter of this thesis, that is, the subjectivity of the individual 
and the impact on it of international jurisprudence. The methodology to be used will be 
analytical and descriptive of the relevant features and will not intend to exhaust all possible 
sources of subjectivity. 
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     II.  2.  1.  The  Mavrommatis  Palestine  Concessions.  August  30th,  1924.- 
Permanent     Court of International Justice51 
The  first  case  to  be  analyzed  corresponds  to  the  Mavrommatis  Case,  decided  by  the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, to which I have already referred to. This decision 
has served as a basis for a longstanting jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, 
in the following sense:
“The International Court of Justice is in a very real sense the continuation of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice”.52
The Mavrommatis Case has become an obligatory referente in the field of the diplomatic 
protection. The judgment of the Court delineates the characteristics of this institution. 
The salient facts of this case were the following: 
The Government  of  the  Greek  Republic  submitted  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice a suit arising out of the alleged refusal on the part of the Government of Palestine and the 
Britannic Majesty´s Government (in its  capacity as Mandatory for Palestine), since the year 
1921, to recognize to their full extent the rights acquired by M. Mavrommatis, a Greek subject, 
under contracts and agreements concluded by him with the Ottoman authorities in regard to 
concession for certain public works to be constructed in Palestine. The application concluded 
with a request that the Court may be pleased to give judgment to the effect that the Government 
of Palestine and the Government of His Britannic Majesty, recognize to their full  extent the 
rights acquired by M. Mavrommatis, and that the Government of his Britannic Majesty shall 
make  reparation  for  the  consequent  loss  incurred  by  said  Greek  subject.  The  Britannic 
Government filed a preliminary objection to the Court´s jurisdiction stating that the Court had 
no jurisdiction to entertain the case.53
The Judgment:
 “In the case of the Mavrommatis concessions it is true that the dispute was at first 
between a private person and a State – i.e. between M. Mavrommatis  and Great 
Britain.  Subsequently the Greek Government took up the case. The dispute then 
51 Mavrommatis Case, PCIJ Series A, No.2, Judgment of 30 August 1924.
52 Phillip  C.  Jessup.  “A  Modern  Law  of  Nations:  An  Introduction  (Hamden,  1947),  p.  147;  “/…/the 
International Court of Justice is the legal successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the  
jurisprudence of the latter remains pertinent and compelling to this day” - Rosalyn Higgins: “The ICJ, the 
ECJ, and Integrity of International Law” (2003) 52 ICLQ 1 at 3. See.  Ole Spiermann: “International Legal  
Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Rise of the International Judiciary”. Series: 
Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Nro. 34.
53 Mavrommatis Case, PCIJ Series A, No.2, Judgment of 30 August 1924, p.7.ss. 
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entered upon a new phase; it entered the domain of international law, and became 
a dispute between two States."54 (Enphasis added) 
The judgment is illustrative of the classical conception of international law. This is, that 
international law provides mainly channels for the exercise of rights granted to the States 
and that it is through them, that the protection of individuals is envisioned. 
The Permanent Court said:
“It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its 
subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another 
State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary 
channels.  By  taking  up  the  case  of  one  of  its  subjects  and  by  resorting  to  
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in  
reality asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,  
respect for the rules of international law.  The question, therefore, whether the 
present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact 
is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a 
State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international 
tribunal,  in  the eyes  of  the latter  the State  is  sole  claimant.  The fact  that  Great 
Britain  and  Greece  are  the  opposing  Parties  to  the  dispute  arising  out  of  the 
Mavrommatis  concessions  is  sufficient  to  make it  a  dispute  between two States 
within the meaning of Article 26 of the Palestine Mandate.”55 (Emphasis added)
The Court precises the concept of diplomatic protection and recreates the conditions  by 
means of which it can be exercised. Although this did not implied a denial of the right 
possessed by Mavrommatis  himself  (individual),  the judgment confirms that the subject 
matter before the Court is an international issue that is directly related to a State’s own 
right. This does not need further comments as the judgment is perfectly clear. At the same 
time,  the  Court  does  not  conceal  that  Mavrommatis  had  interests  in  the  result  of  the 
controvery, but it does not transform the jurisdictional instance before the tribunal in a case 
where an individual right-holder is directly claiming the recognition or restoration of a right 
from a State.56  
54 Mavrommatis Case, PCIJ Series A, No.2, Judgment of 30 August 1924, p.12. 
55 IBID, p.12. It identifies the origins of this institution in the notion of diplomatic protection by Emmerich de 
Vattel, who wrote in 1758: “whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect that  
citizen” - E de Vattel The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the  
Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns vol 3 Of War (Carnegie Institution Washington 1916). 
56“It was deeply entrenched in a classic conception of international law, where the individuals would have no  
rights and international standing on the international legal plane”- Enrico Milano, Diplomatic Protection 
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Immediately after this case, the Permanent Court of International Justice had another 
opportunity of expressing its opinion about the same institution. In this new case, an 
evolution of the jurisprudence can be perceived.
II.  2. 2.  Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of Danzig Railway 
Officials  who  have  passed  into  the  Polish  Service,  against  the  Polish  Railways 
Administration)57
The saliente facts of this case were the following:
The Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertook to negotiate a treaty between the Polish 
Government and the Free City of Danzig under Article 104 of the Treaty of Versailles, in order 
to ensure to Poland the control and administration of the whole railway system within the Free 
City.  It  contains  provisions  to  the  effect  that  the  Danzig  railways  shall  be  controlled  and 
administered by Poland. Article 22 of the Convention stated:  “Subsequent agreements to be 
concluded  between Poland  and  the  Free  City  …shall  settle… any questions  relating  to  the 
retention of officials employees and workmen at present employed on the railways and to the 
maintenance of rights acquired by them, and questions relating to…all matters concerning the 
administration, exploitation and services /…/.” Based on this Agreement between Poland and 
the Free City of Danzig (Beamtenabkommen), the Court was called to give an opinion about 
question relating to actions brought by Danzig officials for the recovery of pecuniary claims. 58
 The Permanent Court gave the following Advisory Opinion:
“The point in dispute…: Does the Beamtenabkommen59, as it stands, form part of 
the  series  of  provisions  governing  the  legal  relationship  between  the  Polish 
Railways Administration and the Danzig officials who have passed into its service 
(contract of service)? The answer to this question depends upon the intention of the 
contracting Parties. It may be readily admitted that, according to a well established 
principle  of  international  law,  the  Beamtenabkommen,  being an international  
agreement,  cannot,  as  such,  create  direct  rights  and  obligations  for  private  
individuals.  But it  cannot  be disputed that  the very object  of  an international  
agreement,  according  to  the  intention  of  the  contracting  Parties,  may  be  the  
adoption  by the  Parties  of  some definite  rules  creating  individuals  rights  and 
obligations and enforceable by the national courts”.60 (Emphasis added)
before the International Court of Justice: Refashioning Tradition?, Netherland Yearbook of International Law 
XXXV (2004), p. 87
57 Jurisdiction of the Court of Danzig, Advisory Opinions, PCIJ Series B, No. 15, March 3rd, 1928.
58 Jurisdiction of the Court of Danzig, Advisory Opinions, PCIJ Series B, No. 15, March 3rd, 1928.
59Beamtenabkommen  was  the  agreement  which  created  a  special  legal  régime  governing  the  relations 
between the Polish Railways Administration and the Danzig officials, workmen and employees who have 
passed into the permanent service of the Polish Administration. Jurisdicition of the Court of Danzig, Advisory 
Opinions, PCIJ Series B, No. 15, March 3rd, 1928.
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To the author of this study, the redaction of this paragraph is not clear. In it, the Court 
affirms and denies at the same time, the possibility of the creation of rights for the 
individual by means of a treaty. Coinciding with the previous sentence, the Court lays out 
the operative space of international law excluding individuals of the possibility of being 
directly subject to the rights and duties created by a treaty. Nevertheless, in the second part 
of the paragraph, the Court seems to take a different approach and instead of referring to 
the interest of private persons (Mavrommatis) which may coincide in certain cases with the 
rights  of  States,  the  Court  states  that  by  means  of  international  agreements  States  can 
generate rules on rights and duties applicable to individuals, enforceable before national 
courts. 
The about mentioned judgment and the advisory opinion provide an initial analysis of the 
Court on the matter of the subjectivity of individuals. In these cases, the Court does not 
support the existence of rights of individuals based on international law, due to dominant 
inter-state concept of international law at that time. Over time, the quality of right-holders 
will be acknowledged to the individual, and a new debate about the individual subjectivity 
will emerge in international law: the dissociation between entitlement to a right and the 
procedural means for its exercise. 
It is apparent that the means through  which the legal interests or rights of the individual 
will be protected in accordance with the competentes of the International Court of Justice 
will be the diplomatic protection. The diplomatic protection implies this sort of fiction for 
the protection of the individual rights, being that the State claims against another State as if 
the State’ rights itself have been violated.
Among  its  requirements,  the  diplomatic  protection  envisions  the  nationality  of  the 
individual,  whose  claim  the  State  assumes,  exercising  the  right  to  project  granted  by 
international  law.  This  requirement,  the  nationality  link,  was  enunciated  by  the 
International Court of Justice in the judgment we will see below.
II. 2. 3. Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of April 6th, 195561 
60 Jurisdiction of the Court of Danzig, Advisory Opinions, PCIJ Series B, No. 15, March 3rd, 1928.pp.17-18.
61 Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of April 6th, 1955: ICJ. Reports 1955, p. 4.
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The salient facts of this case were the following:
Nottebohm was born at Hamburg on September 16th, 1881. He was German by birth. In 1905 
he went to Guatemala. He took up residence there and made that country the headquarters of his 
business activities. On October 9th,  1939, a little more than a month after the opening of the 
Second World War,  Nottebohm submitted an application for  naturalization in Liechtenstein. 
Guatemala, after having declared war to Germany, expelled Notebohm and retained the property 
that Notebohn had has in the country. Relying on the nationality thus conferred on Nottebohn, 
Liechtenstein  considered  itself  entitled  to  seize  the  Court  based  on  a  claim  on  his  behalf. 
Guatemala, on the other hand, requested the Court “to declare that the claim of the Principality 
of Liechtenstein is inadmissible, and sated forth a number of grounds relating to the nationality 
of Liechtenstein granted to Nottebohm by naturalization.  The real issue before the Court was 
the admissibility of the claim of Liechtenstein in respect of Nottebohm.62
The Judgment of the Court stated that:
“In the present case it is necessary to determine whether the naturalization conferred 
on  Nottebohm can  be  successfully  invoked  against  Guatemala,  whether,  as  has 
already been stated, it can be relied upon as against that State, so that Liechtenstein 
is  thereby  entitled  to  exercise  its  protection  in  favour  of  Nottebohm  against 
Guatemala.”63
“/…/a  State  cannot  claim  that  the  rules  it  has  thus  laid  down  are  entitled  to 
recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim  
of  making  the  legal  bond  of  nationality  accord  with  the  individual's  genuine 
connection with the State which assumes the defense of its citizens by means of 
protection as against other States.”64 (Emphasis added)
“According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions65 and to the 
opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of  
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together  
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the 
juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred,  
either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact  
more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality  
than with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to 
exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical 
terms  of  the  individual's  connection  with  the  State  which  has  made  him  its 
nacional.”66 (Emphasis added)
62 IBID, p. 4.
63 IBID, p. 21
64 IBID, p. 21
65 In that sense, Canevaro Case (“Affaire Canevaro (italy v. Peru)  “(1961) 11 RIAA 397,) of the Permant 
Court of Arbitration is a direct antecedent of this judgment.
66 IBID, p. 23
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“/…/  the Court  must  ascertain  whether  the nationality  granted to  Nottebohm by 
means of naturalization is of this character or, in other words, whether the factual 
connection  between  Nottebohm  and  Liechtenstein  in  the  period  preceding, 
contemporaneous with and following his naturalization appears to be sufficiently 
close,  so  preponderant  in  relation  to  any  connection  which  may  have  existed 
between  him  and  any  other  State,  that  it  is  possible  to  regard  the  nationality  
conferred upon him as real and effective, as the exact juridical  expression of a 
social  fact  of  a  connection  which  existed  previously  or  came  into  existence 
thereafter.”67 (Emphasis added)
“Naturalization  was asked for  not  so much for the purpose of  obtaining  a  legal 
recognition of Nottebohm's membership in fact in the population of Liechtenstein, 
as it was to enable him to substitute for his status as a national of a belligerent State 
that of a national of a neutral State, with the sole aim of thus coming within the 
protection  of  Liechtenstein  but  not  of  becoming  wedded  to  its  traditions,  its 
interests, its way of life or of assuming the obligations-other than fiscal obligations-
and exercising the rights pertaining to the status thus acquired. Guatemala is under 
no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in such circumstances. Liechtenstein 
consequently  is  not  entitled  to  extend  its  protection  to  Nottebohm  vis-à-vis 
Guatemala and its claim must, for this reason, be held to be inadmissible.”68
The  diplomatic  protection  appears  then  as  simulated  means  of  protection  of  rights  or 
interests of individuals. It is worth mentioning that it may not be exercised in all the cases. 
The requirement of nationality has been asserted by the preceeding judgment based on the 
necessity of a real and effective link between the individual and the State.69 In this way the 
diplomatic protection is not a means of protection of individuals at every moment, as it is 
the case of the human rights regimes, but only in cases where the individual is national of 
the State which exercises it. The nationality element involves a high standard of reliance of 
the individual on the State so as to serve as a basis for the diplomatic protection. 
Three characteristics of the diplomatic protection should be mentioned in this context. First, 
the  inidividual  is  not  supposed  to  participate  in  the  differents  stages  of  the  process; 
67 IBID, p. 26
68 IBID, p. 26
69"This right is necessarily limited to intervention (by a State) on behalf of its own nationals because, in the  
absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nationality between the State and the individual which alone 
confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection, and it is as a part of the function of diplomatic  
protection that the right to take up a claim and to ensure respect for the rules of international law must be 
envisaged." - Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I. J., Series A/B, No. 76, p. 16.
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secondly, it is the State exercising protection that determines the remedies to the wrong 
caused to the individual and consents to those; thirdly, the exercise of the diplomatic 
protection depends on the will of the State. I will refer to these points later.
 
Currently, the strict definition of the elements of the diplomatic protection arising from the 
Nottebohm’s jurisprudence has been subject to revision in subsequent cases to favour a 
wider application of this insitution: “/…/ If the existence of a genuine link were required in  
addition to nationality for the purpose of diplomatic protection, this would exclude millions  
of  persons  from  the  benefit  of  diplomatic  protection  as  in  today's  world  of  economic  
globalization and   migration there are millions of persons who have moved away from 
their  State  of  nationality  and  made  their  lives  in  States  whose  nationality  they  never  
acquire, or have acquired nationality by birth or descent from States with which they have  
a  tenuous  connection.”70 This  is  reflected  in  the  project  of  the  International  Law 
Commission  that  deals  with  the  possibility  of  diplomatic  protection  to  people  without 
nationality  or  who  are  refugees.  Thus,  article  8  of the  Draft  Articles  on  Diplomatic 
Protection states: 
1. “A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person who, at  
the date of the injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim, is  
lawfully and habitually resident in that State.
2. A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who is recognized  
as a refugee by that State, in accordance with internationally accepted standards,  
when  that  person,  at  the  date  of  the  injury  and  at  the  date  of  the  official  
presentation of the claim, is lawfully and habitually resident in that State.
3. Paragraph 2 does not apply in respect of an injury caused by an internationally  
wrongful act of the State of nationality of the refugee.”71
70 Dugard, John: Diplomatic Protection, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online 
edition, www.mpepil.com, visted on 1 February 2010. 
71 “Special forms of protection have also been recognized in the case of stateless persons, and special rules  
have also been provided under the Convention on the Nationality of  Women for situations of  change of  
nationality because of marriage as in respect of military service in cases of double nationality and other  
special situations. The situations examined evidence that the link of nationality has lost to an extent its rigor  
in the context of international claims.”- Orrego Vicuña, F.: “The Changing Approaches to the Nationality of  
claims in the context of Diplomatic Protection and International Dispute Settlement”. International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID Review. 1986. 15 (2000) 1, p. 347.
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With  the  emergence  and  further  evolution  of  human  rights  regimes,  it  has  been 
considered  that  the diplomatic  protection  would slowly lose its  role,  giving  way to 
systems of protection of human rights that would contemplate in a more perfect form the 
interests of the individual, since this would not be subject to the will of the State exercising 
his own rights by diplomatic means or through international procedures, allowing at the 
same time the possibility to claim against the State the nationality. However, the lack of 
acknowledgement  of a  locus  standi of  the individuals  in  the  most  of  the human rights 
judicial protection systems (with the exception of the European Court of Human Rights that 
contemplates the direct access of individuals), has determined that the diplomatic protection 
mantains its role. In a series of decision to be explained later, it will be observed that the 
use given to the institution and the debate generated therein are indicative of the important 
of the protection granted by the State.
II. 2. 4. LaGrand (Germany v. United States of América), Judgment, I.C.J 
Reports, 2001.72
The direct precedent to this judgment was the case concerning the Vienna Convention on 
Consular  Relations  (Request  for  the  Indication  of  Provisional  Measures)  (Paraguay  v. 
USA), more known as Breard case. These judgments, together with the Avena Case (2004) 
constitute a group of judgment which consists of the same subject: the violation of art 36 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular  Relations  by the United States,  in cases of capital 
punishment. I will analyse the judgment passed on LaGrand and Avena cases where the 
following features can be found. 
The salient facts of the case are:
The Federal Republic of Germany filed  in an Application instituting proceedings against the 
United  States  of  America  for  violations  of  article  5  and  36  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on 
Consular Relations. Germany alleges that the failure of the United State to inform to Karl and 
Walter LaGrand, german nationals, who were arrested, detained and sentenced by the state of 
Arizona,  of  their  right  to  contact  the  German  authorities.  Germany  further  alleges  that  by 
breaching its obligations to inform, the United States also violated individuals rights conferred 
on the detainees by Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (b). The LaGrand´s brothers were sentenced 
to capital punishment by the state of Arizona. Karl LaGrand was executed in February 1999, 
before the proceeding. Walter LaGrand´s execution took place on March 3rd, 1999.73
72 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of América), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2001, p. 466. 
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Provisional Measures
“32. In a Order of 3 March 1999, the Court found that the circumstances required it 
to indicate, as a matter of the greatest urgency and without any other proceedings, 
provisional measurers…: a) The United States of America should take all measures 
at  its  disposal  to  ensure  that  Walter  LaGrand is  not  executed  pending the  final 
decision  in  these  proceedings,  and  should  inform the  Court  of  all  the  measures 
which  it  has  taken  in  implementation  of  this  Order;  b)  The  Government  of  the 
United States of America should transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of 
Arizona.”74
In its judgment, the Court affirmed that it could not accept the contention of the United 
States  that  Germany’s  claim based on the  individual  rights  of  the LaGrand brothers  is 
beyond the  Court  jurisdiction  because  diplomatic  protection  is  a  concept  of  customary 
international law. To this respect, the decision said:  
“42.  /…/  [T]his  fact  does  not  prevent  a  State  party  to  a  treaty,  which  creates  
individual rights,  from taking up the case of one of its  nationals  and instituting 
international judicial proceeding on behalf of the national, on the basis of a general 
jurisdictional  clause  in  such  a  treaty.  Therefore  the  Court  concludes  that  it  has 
jurisdiction with respect to the whole of Germany´s first submission.”75 (Emphasis 
added)
“75. Germany further contends that “the breach of Article 36 by the United States  
did not only infringe upon the rights of Germany as a State party to the Vienna 
Convention but also entailed a violation of the individual rights of the LaGrand 
brothers”.  Invoking its right of diplomatic protection,  Germany also seeks relief 
against the United States on this ground. Germany maintains that the  rights to be  
informed  of  the  rights  under  Article  36,  paragraph  1  (b),  of  the  Vienna 
Convention,  is  an  individual  right  of  every  national  of  a  State  party  to  the 
Convention who enters the territory of another State party. It submits that this view 
is supported by the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of 
the  Vienna  Convention,  since  the  last  sentence  of  that  provision  speaks  of  the 
“rights”  under  this  subparagraph  of  “the  person  concerned”,  i.e.  of  the  foreign 
national  arrested  or  detained.  Germany  adds  that  the  provision  in  Article  36, 
paragraph 1 (b), according to which it is for the arrested person to decide whether 
consular notification is to be provided, has the effect of conferring an individual 
right upon the foreign national concerned.  In its view,  the context of Article 36  
supports this conclusion since it relates to both the concerns of the sending and 
receiving States and to those of individuals. According to Germany, the travaux 
73 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of América), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2001, p. 466
74 IBID, para. 32
75 IBID, para. 42
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preparatoires of the Vienna Convention lend further support to this interpretation. In 
addition,  Germany  submits  that  the  “United  Nations  Declaration  on  the  human 
rights  of  individuals  who are  not  nationals  of  the  country  in  which  they  live”, 
adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/144 on 13 December 1985, confirms 
the view that the rights of access to the consulate of the home State, as well as the 
information on this right, constitute individual rights of foreign nationals and are to 
e regarded as human rights of aliens.”76 (Emphasis added)
“77. The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the obligations the 
receiving State has towards the detained person and the sending State. It provides 
that,  at  the  request  of  the  detained  person,  the  receiving  State  must  inform the 
consular post of the sending State of the individual´s detention “without delay”. It 
provides further that any communication by the detained person addressed to the 
consular post  of the sending State must be forwarded to it  by authorities  of the 
receiving  State  “without  delay”.  Significantly,  this  subparagraph  ends  with  the 
following language: “The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without 
delay of his  rights  under this  subparagraph” (emphasis  added).  Moreover,  under 
Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), the sending State´s right to provide consular assistance 
to the detained person may not be exercised “if he expressly opposes such action”. 
The  clarity  of  these  provisions,  viewed in  their  context,  admits  of  no  doubt.  It 
follows, as has been held on a number of occasions, that the Court must apply these 
as  they  stand  (see  Acquisition  of  Polish  Nationality,  Advisory  Opinion,  1923, 
P.C.I.J,  Series  B,  No.7,  p.  20;  Competence  of  the  General  Assembly  for  the 
Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, 
p. 8; Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment I.C.J. Reports 1991, pp. 69-70, para. 
48; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyal v. Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1994, p. 25, para. 51)/…/”77 
Based  on  the  above  mentioned  provisions,  “the  Court  concludes  that  Article  36,  
paragraph 1,  creates  individual  rights,  which,  by  virtue  of  Article  I  of  the  Optional  
Protocol, may be invoked in the Court by the national State of the detained person. These 
rights were violated in the present case.”78 (Emphasis added)
  
At  the  hearings,  “Germany  further  contended  that  the  right  of  the  individual  to  be  
informed without delay under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention was not  
only  an  individual  right  by  has  today  assumed  the  character  of  a  human  right. In 
consequence, Germany added, “the character of the right under Article 36 as a human right 
renders the effectiveness of this provision even more imperative”. The Court having found 
that  the  United  States  violated  the  rights  accorded  by  Article  36,  paragraph  1,  to  the 
LaGrand brothers, it does not appear necessary to it to consider the additional argument  
developed by Germany in this regard.”79 (Emphasis added)
76 IBID, para. 75
77 IBID, para. 77
78 IBID, para. 77.
79 IBID, para. 78.
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The exercise of the diplomatic protection shows in a clear way the scope of protection 
granted  to  certain  identifiable  individuals.  This  is  mainly  the  case  of  the  adoption  of 
provisional  measure  by  the  Court  to  protect  fundamental  rights  of  the  individuals 
concerned. If the case had been conceived strictly as a case of violation of State’s rights, the 
Court would not have been able to justify a measure in the case as matter of urgency.80 
These cases illustrate that the Court does not see necesary to remark that the diplomatic 
protection is exercised only to protect the States’ rights and that it indifferent whether or 
not said rights coincide with the rights claimed by private persons.81 In the evolution of 
international  law  it  is  no  longer  a  principle  the  non  existence  of  right  attributed  to 
individuals. On the contrary, the change of mindset has opened the way to analysis based 
on the scope of the rights created by a treaty. This trend does not only acknowledge the 
existence of rights for individuals, but also contemplates them clearly in order to resolve 
the case, can be seen here.82 
Later,  the  Court  accepted  that  the  individuals  were  to  be  considered  as  rights-holders, 
taking into consideration art. 36 of the Vienna Convencion on Consular Relations, in spite 
the fact that this instrument does not refer to this category of principles.
80“All three request for provisional measures submitted to the Court by Paraguay, Germany and Mexico  
were intended to avoid prejudice of the states` rights, but it was more than clear the direct link with the  
preservation of the right to life of the detainees, which came into the dispute through the back door of the  
VCCR…The remedies (provisional measure) ordered in the final judgements in LaGrand and Avena also 
show the willingness of the Court to go beyond the mere protection of state interest and to protect the rights  
of  the  individual,  and  arguably  its  human  rights.”-  Enrico  Milano,  Diplomatic  Protection  before  the 
International Court of Justice: Refashioning Tradition? Netherland Yearbook of International Law XXXV 
(2004), pp. 132, 134.
81 “In the LaGrand case,  Professor Bruno Simma, appearing before the Court on behalf  of  the German  
Government, said that: it is difficult to see…why something which looks like an individual right, feels like an  
individual  right  and  smells  like  an  individual  right  should  be  anything  else  but  an  individual  rights”- 
Spiermann, O: The LaGrand Case and the Individual as a Subject of International Law”. Zeitshrift für öf 
fentlicles Recht (ZÖR). 58 (2003), p. 201. 
82 “Inevitably, the mechanisms of diplomatic protection have a privileged position in a judicial mechanism  
such as that of the ICJ, and they represent the most obvious strategy to seek legal protection before that  
Court for the individual´s human rights/…/ in LaGrand the Court, for the very first time, recognizes, besides  
the specific rights of the state, both the existence of individual rights not of an economic or patrimonial  
nature conferred by an international treaty, in the specific case the right to notification under Article 36 of  
the  VCCR;  and  the  possibility  for  the  state  to  act  in  diplomatic  protection  for  the  protection  of  those 
individual rights on the basis of a jurisdictional clause in the treaty itself /…/”- Enrico Milano, Diplomatic 
Protection  before  the  International  Court  of  Justice:  Refashioning  Tradition?,  Netherland  Yearbook  of 
International Law XXXV (2004), pp. 109 – 128.
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 Previosly, the  Interamerican  Court  of  Human Rights  had  referred  to  this  particular 
institution  during  the  proceedings  concerning  the  Advisory  Opinion  on  the  Right  to 
Information  on  Consular  Assistance  in  the  Framework  of  the  Guarantees  of  the  Due 
Process of Law:83
 “124: In other words, the individual’s right to information, conferred in Article 36 
(1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, makes it possible for the 
right to the due process of law upheld in Article 14 of the International Convenant 
on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  to  have  practical  effects  in  tangible  cases;  the 
minimum guarantees established in Article 14 of the International Convenant can be 
amplified in the light of other international instruments like the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, which broadens the scope of the protection afforded to those 
accosed.”84
Certainly although this relation can be made between the right of individuals to inform their 
governements for the exercise of diplomatic protection on their  favour, with the human 
right of due process, we believe it is necessary to make an explanation. The right that a 
national has according to article 36 (b) of the Vienna Convention must not be confused 
with  the  faculty  that  the  State,  to  which  he  belongs,  has  to  exercise  such  diplomatic 
protection or to refuse it. That is to say, the acknowledgement of the right of an individual 
to  inform his  State  is  not  translated  into  the  duties  of  the  State  to  exercise  diplomatic 
protection. At least, this obligation for the State does not arise from the international law. 
Effectively,  in the Draff  Articles  on Diplomatic  Protection,  first  report,  presented by J. 
Dugard to the International Law Commssion, he expressed this discretional criterion on the 
83 The  Interamerican  Court  of  Human Rights  “/…/  fue  efectivamente  el  primer  tribunal  internacional  a 
advertir que el incumplimiento del artículo 36 (1)(b) de la Convención de Viena sobre Relaciones Consulares 
de 1963 se daba en perjuicio no sólo de un Estado Parte en dicha Convención sino también de los seres 
humanos  afectados”-  Vote  of  the  Judge  A.A.  Cancado  Trindade,  in  the  Advisory  Opinion  on  Juridical 
Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants OC-18/03 of 17 September, 2003.  The Opinion was 
requested by the United Mexican states. 
84 I/A Court H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance. In the Framework of the Guarantees of 
the due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999.  Series A No. 16, par. 124. See. 
Monica Feria Tinta: “Due Process and the Right to Life in the Context of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations: Arguing the LaGrand Case”. EJIL (2001), Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 363-366.
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part of the State to grant diplomatic protection. However, he stated certain limits to this 
discretion.85 According to Article 4 of the project of the Commission stated:  
“1. Unless the injured person is able to bring a claim for such injury before a competent 
international court o tribunal, the state of his/her nationality has a legal duty to exercise  
diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured person upon request, if  the injury results  
from a grave breach of a jus cogens norm attributable to another state.
2. The state of nationality is relieved of this obligation if: 
(a) the exercise of diplomatic protection would seriously endanger the overriding  
interests of the state and/or its people; 
(b) another state exercised diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured person;  
and
(c) the injured person does not have the effective and dominant nationality of the  
state. 
3. States are obliged to provide in their municipal law for the enforcement of this right  
before a competent domestic court or other independent national authority.”86
The Commission considerered that there was not enough international practice to sustain 
that the diplomatic protection was a duty of the State. Therefore, the right of the individual 
to  inform  his  government,  not  guarantee  that  the  State  would  grant  later  diplomatic 
protection. 
In“Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa”87, the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa stated to this respect:  
85 Enrico Milano, Diplomatic Protection before the International Court of Justice: Refashioning Tradition?, 
Netherland Yearbook of International Law XXXV (2004), p. 94
86 Report of the ILC (52nd Session) Suppl 10, A/55/10, 158, 456 (2000). “In introducting this article I fully  
acknowledged that  it  was proposed de lege ferenda as it  had little  state  practice to support  it.  After an 
extensive debate on this proposal, in which the view was repeatedly expressed that diplomatic protection was  
not a human right, I had no alternative but to propose that the provision be not referred to the drafting  
committee – that is, to withdraw it – on the grounds that the general view was that the issue was not yet ripe  
for the attention of the Commission and that there was a need for more state practice and, particulary, more  
opinion  juris  before  it  could be  considered.  I  greatly  regret  that  this  was necessary”  – Dugard,  John:  
Diplomatic  Protection  and Human Rights:  The  Draft  Article  of  the  International  Law Commission.  The 
Australian Yearbook of International Law. 1966. 24 (2005), p. 80.
87 Kaunda and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa, (CCT 23/04), 2004 (10) BCCR 1009. 
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69. “There may thus be a duty on government, consistent with its obligation under 
international law, to take action to protect one of its citizens against  a gross 
abuse  of  international  human  rights  norm.  A  request  to  the  government  for 
assistance in such circumstance where the evidence is clear would be difficult, and 
in extreme cases possibly impossible to refuse. It is unlikely that such a request 
would  ever  be  refused  by  government,  but  if  it  were,  the  decision  would  be 
justiciable, and a court could order the government to take appropriate action.”88
70.“There may even be a duty on government in extreme cases to provide assistance to 
its nationals against egregious breaches of international human rights which come to 
its knowledge. The victims of such breaches may not be in a position to ask for 
assistance,  and  in  such  circumstance  on  becoming  aware  of  the  breaches,  the 
government may well be obliged to take an initiative itself.”89
71.“Even in  those countries  where the constitution  recognises  that  the state  has an 
obligation  to  afford such protection,  the  ILC report  suggests  that  there  is  some 
doubt as to whether that obligation is justiciable under municipal law.”90
72.A court cannot tell the government how to make diplomatic interventions for the 
protection of its nationals./…/ 74. Although the exercise of the discretion can be 
tested for compliance with the constitution/…/”91
The acknowledgement of a right to demand diplomatic protection in favour of individuals, 
would obviously be an important element to support the subjectivity of those based on an 
indirect procedural capacity in the international arena. However, this acknoledgement is not 
consequent with the actual international practice which sees a discretional faculty by the 
State in the exercise of diplomatic protection.92
In the particular case of LaGrand, the domestic judgment aimed at the application of death 
penalty to the two inidicted individuals. The judgment, however, provides elements to this 
88 IBID, para. 69
89 IBID, para. 70
90 IBID, para. 71
91 IBID, para. 72, 74
92 “The only true exception is probably represented by Germany, where the Constitutional Court has clearly  
stated the constitutional duty of diplomatic protection in favour of German nationals; but even in the German  
case the Federal Administrative Court has maintained that such a constitutional duty should be weighed  
against the discretionary power involved in the conduct of foreign affairs by the executive”. Enrico Milano, 
Diplomatic  Protection  before  the  International  Court  of  Justice:  Refashioning  Tradition?,  Netherland 
Yearbook of International Law XXXV (2004), p. 96.
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study.  It  identifies  individuals  as  a  rights  holders,  and  flexibilizes  the  fiction  of 
diplomatic protection, considering it as a means of protection of individuals rights. 
II.2.5Avena and Other Mexican Nationls (Mexico v. United States of America)93
Facts
Mexico asked the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare, that the United States, in 
arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencing the 54 Mexican nationals on death row , 
violated international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise or its right 
of consular protection of its nationals, as provided by Articles 5 and 36, respectively of the 1963 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The original claim related to 54 such persons, but as 
a result of subsequent adjustments to the claim, Mexico brought a claim for 52 individual cases.
The Judgment
“It would further observe that violations of the right of the individual under Article  
36 may entail a violation of the rights of the sending State, and that violations of the  
rights of the latter may entail a violation of' the rights of the individual. In these 
special  circumstances  of  interdependence  of  the  rights  of  the  State:  and  of  
individual rights, Mexico may, in submitting a claim in its own name, request the 
Court to rule on the violation of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly 
and through the violation of individual rights conferred on Mexican nationals under 
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b).”94(Emphasis added)
“124.  Mexico has further contended that the right to consular notification and 
consular communication under the Vienna Convention is a fundamental human  
right  that  constitutes  part  of due process in criminal  proceedings  and should be 
guaranteed  in  the  territory  of  each  of  the  Contracting  Parties  to  the  Vienna 
Convention ; according to Mexico,  this right,  as such, is so fundamental  that  its 
infringement will ipso facto produce the effect of vitiating the entire process of the 
criminal proceedings conducted in violation of this fundamental right.  Whether or  
not the Vienna Convention rights are human rights is not a matter that this Court  
need decide. The Court would,  however,  observe that  neither  the text  nor the  
object  and  purpose  of  the  Convention,  nor  any  indication  in  the  travaux 
preparatoires,  support the conclusion that Mexico draws from its contention in  
that regard.”95 (Emphasis added)
93 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 
p. 12
94 IBID, para 40
95 IBID, para 124
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It results from the last paragraph, that the Court denies the character of human right to 
the right to notify or to inform to the consulate of the country of the nationality in the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  In  spite  of  this,  the  Court  acknowledges  that  a  treaty  of 
international law may directly create a right for an individual, as it had already stated in 
LaGrand Case. 
The doctrine has referred to the growing strategy of the States in linking its claim to human 
rights: 
“There are probably three paramount reasons behind the choice of States to link 
human  rights  and  diplomatic  protection.  The  first  one  is  that  the  standard  of  
treatment  for  aliens  is  particulary  determined  by  the  law  of  human  rights  
nowadays…The  second  reason  is  definitely  a  rhetorical  one:  states  and  world 
public  opinion are nowadays so sensitive  at  accusations of  violations  of  human  
rights that to present an individual right under a certain convention as a human 
right  makes  sure  that  the  legal  claim related  to  its  violations  carries  with  it  a  
broader appeal and a broader political implication…The third reason is evident in 
the  Breard,  LaGrand and Avena  and it  has  to  do  with  the  effectiveness  of  the 
remedies sought by the applicants. In all three cases, the applicant states in their  
request for provisional measures stated that the provisional measures were directed 
to prevent a prejudice to their right and the rights of their nationals”.96 
At the same time, a flexibilization of the classical  criteria which defined the diplomatic 
protection derives from this phenomenon, generating consequences for the defense of rights 
granted to individual by international law. 
II.2.6 Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic 
Republic of Congo) Preliminary Objections.   ( May 24th, 2007) 97
Facts
96 Enrico Milano, Diplomatic Protection before the International Court of Justice: Refashioning Tradition?, 
Netherland Yearbook of International Law XXXV (2004), pp. 122-123.
97 Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo) 
Preliminary Objections. ICJ ( May 24th, 2007)
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Guinea filled an application to the International Court of Justice instituting proceedings against 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo for damage suffered by Mr. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, a 
businessman of  Guinean nationality,  allegedly  unjustly  imprisoned by the  authorities  of  the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, after being resident in that State for thirty-two (32) years. 
Mr.  Diallo  had already been despoiled of  his  sizable  investments,  businesses,  movable  and 
immovable property and bank accounts, and then expelled. This expulsion, stated Guinea,  came 
at a time when Mr. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo was pursuing recovery of substantial debts owed to 
his businesses by the State and by oil companies established in its territory and of which the 
State was a shareholder.
The Judgment of the Court stated the following:
39.  “The Court will recall that under customary international law, as reflected in 
Article 1 of the draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection of the International Law 
Commission  (hereinafter  the  “ILC”),  “diplomatic  protection  consists  of  the 
invocation  by  a  State,  through  diplomatic  action  or  other  means  of  peaceful 
settlement,  of  the  responsibility  of  another  State  for  an  injury  caused  by  an 
internationally  wrongful  act  of  that  State  to  a  natural  or  legal  person  that  is  a 
national  of  the  former  State  with  a  view  to  the  implementation  of  such 
responsibility” (Article 1 of the draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection adopted by 
the ILC at its Fifty-eighth Session (2006), ILC Report, doc. A/61/10, p. 24). Owing 
to the substantive development of international law over recent decades in respect  
of the rights it accords to individuals, the scope  ratione materiae  of diplomatic  
protection,  originally  limited to alleged violations  of the minimum standard of  
treatment  of  aliens,  has  subsequently  widened  to  include,  inter  alia,  
internationally guaranteed human rights.”98 (Emphasis added)
94. “In view of the foregoing, the Court cannot accept Guinea’s claim to exercise 
diplomatic  protection  by  substitution.  It  is  therefore  the  normal  rule  of  the 
nationality of the claims which governs the question of the diplomatic protection of 
Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire. The companies in question have Congolese 
nationality.  The  objection  as  to  inadmissibility  raised  by  the  DRC  owing  to 
Guinea’s lack of standing to offer Mr. Diallo diplomatic protection as regards the 
alleged unlawful acts of the DRC against the rights of the two companies Africom-
Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire is consequently well founded and must be upheld.”99
96. “In view of all the foregoing, the Court concludes that Guinea’s Application  
is  admissible  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  protection  of  Mr.  Diallo’s  rights  as  an 
individual and his direct rights as  associé  in Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-
Zaire.”100 (Emphasis added)
98 IBID para. 39
99 IBID para. 94
100 IBID para. 96
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This judgment  is  indicative  of  the  acceptance  of  a  link  between  the  diplomatic 
protection and the regime of human rights, in part as a concequence of the influence of 
the regime of human rights in general international.101 
Guinea,  added  to  the  strategy  of  its  claim,  as  also  did  Germany  and  Mexico  in  the 
previously analyzed cases, the action in defense of the human rights of nationals, stating 
that violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the UN Covenant on 
Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  the  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  and Citizen,  had 
occured.
The acceptance of the diplomatic protection as a possible means of protection of the rights 
of  the  individual,  does  not  only  imply  an  advantage  for  the  acknowledgement  of  the 
individual as subject of international  law, but strengthens the exercise of his rights  and 
improves  the  logic  of  certain  necessary  premises  for  the  exercise  of  the  diplomatic 
protection  itself.  For  example,  regarding  the  continuance  of  nationality  rule:  “It  was 
pointed  out  above  that  in  the  light  of  the  State  substituting  its  rights  for  those  of  the  
individual  under  the  traditional  approach to  diplomatic  protection,  the  requirement  of  
continuance of nationality lacked legal logic.”102
However,  in  respect  of  this  new valorization,  one must  be careful.  As this  paper  have 
pointed out, the diplomatic protection presents various limitis as a means of protection of 
the individual.  Its exercise depends mainly on the will of the State of the nationality. The 
101 “The evolution of human rights law and humanitarian law provisions has triggered a revolution in the  
interpretation of international law in other areas. We understand that, since there is no area of law that is not  
related to human rights, these rights have penetrated into all legal approaches (i.a. fight against terrorism,  
racial discrimination, economic, social, and cultural situations, indigenous peoples, investments, integration, 
etc.). Furthermore, with the gradual increase of human rights protections, a greater explicit presence of such 
interests is observed both in national and international legal systems. Increasingly, individuals strive to play  
a more active role in the implementation and enforcement of human rights standards, rather than a passive  
one as beneficiaries of rights and freedoms guaranteed by States. The individual becomes a sort of political  
power,  with new a legal capacity  for the independent  realization of  the rights and duties established by  
international law. This trend is  emerging and is  moving away from a purely state-centered approach to  
international  law”  -  Zlata:  Humanization  of  International  Courts”.  Academia  Nacional  de  Derecho  de 
Cordoba,  aviable in  www.acaderc.org.ar.  p.  3 (This article  was also published in Sosic,  T (Coord)  Liber 
Amigrum Prof. Bodizar Bakotic, Zagred. 2008.) 
102 Orrego Vicuña, F.: “The Changing Approaches to the Nationality of claims in the context of Diplomatic  
Protection and International Dispute Settlement”. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes: 
ICSID Review. 1986. 15 (2000) 1. p. 347.
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obligation of the States to exercise diplomatic protection, when required, has not been 
acknowledged in the international practice. Subjected to the same limitis,  in case of 
exercise of diplomatic protection the State counts on its own discretion to determine the 
reparation measures and the amounts of compensation. The individual does not take part in 
this process.103 Finally, the diplomatic protection is not aimed at processing claims against 
the State of the nationality of the individual injured. 
In this sense, the diplomatic protection cannot replace in any way the jurisdictional limits 
resulting  from article  34  of  the  Statute  of  International  Court  of  Justice.  The  lack  of 
capacity of the individual to bring a claim before this court must be considered as part of 
the consensus of States. In relation to this assertion,  one must take into account that  in 
international law the consensus of the international community members, where the States 
are still the main actors, is of great importance. Nevertheless, slow progress can be made 
regarding the scope of State’s  sovereignty and its  limits,  preventing the fracture of the 
system.104
Furthermore, the experience of the past, where the diplomatic protection appeared only as a 
means used by the most powerful countries, with the capacity to give to their citizens a high 
standard treatment, must not be ignored. This, situation may have been prejudicial to the 
103 “Una  primera  dificultad  fue  que  el  Estado  otorgaba  o  negaba  la  protección  diplomática  a  voluntad, 
influyendo en tal decisión las implicancias de tal reclamo en el contexto de sus intereses en las relaciones 
internacionales o diplomáticas.  De esta manera, los derechos del individuo eran en el hecho subordinados a 
aquellos del Estado. Una segunda dificultad, asociada con lo anterior, era que el Estado controlaba el reclamo 
en todas sus etapas, incluso en la distribución de la indemnización final, que no necesariamente debía ser 
entregada al individuo afectado.”- Orrego Vicuña, F. IBID. (ongoing  publication)
104 “Todo progreso en el orden internacional está condicionado a que los Estados, y de manera más general  
la sociedad, lo perciban como útil y complementario de su estructura nacional. No puede existir un progreso  
que se base en la imposición de intereses ajenos o en el antagonismo respecto de valores que cada uno sea  
dado en el contexto de sus tradiciones históricas y culturales. Una constante que puede observarse en la  
evolución del derecho internacional es  que los Estados buscan salvaguardar legítimamente su autonomía”.  
“Esta autonomía se ha visto relativizada en el curso de la evolución que ha tenido lugar, pero ello lo ha sido  
con la aceptación de los propios Estados. Si se busca reducir esa autonomía contra la voluntad estatal, o  
mediante  la  utilización  de  mecanismos  subrepticios,  lejos  de  lograrse  un  progreso  en  el  derecho  
internacional  se causará una grave  regresión”. Orrego  Vicuña,  F.:  “La Protección  de los  Derechos  del 
Individuo  en  el  Derecho  Internacional:  ¿Es  la  Selectividad  compatible  con  la  Universalidad?”.  Anuario 
Colombiano de Derecho Internacional. ACDI. Vol. 2. Ed. Universidad del Rosario.  Bogota. 2009. (ongoing 
publication)
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States that did not have the capacity or the economical autonomy to exercise the same 
action. 
In  the future, the recourse to the diplomatic protection before the International Court of 
Justice  to  defend  fundamental  rights  acknowledged  to  the  individual  may  show  an 
increasing  acceptance  by  the  international  community  of  the  role  of  States  exercising 
protection.  It  will  also  be  indicative  of  a  growing  acceptance  of  limits  to  the  State 
sovereignty in the field of the rights of the individual. This acknowledgement constitutes a 
step  forward  towards  the  international  subjectivity  of  the  individual,  as  well  as  a  new 
manifestation of the exercise of rights by the individual. 
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CHAPTER III
IN  DIVIDUALS AS DUTY-HOLDERS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL   
RESPONSABILITY
III. 1.  Passive dimension of the international personality of the individual before 
the International Court of Justice
The individual cannot be party to disputes before the Court. The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice prevents individuals from being parties to case brought before it.  As a 
consequence, the Court, is not competent to determine the responsibility of an individual 
for the breach of a international duties, among the matters to which the Court is called upon 
to decide.105 Notwithstanding this, the Court may be called to judge upon cases in which 
individuals’ conduct is directly related to the responsability of a State in accordance with 
international law, as a consequence of the attribution of said conduct to the State. 
In some of these situations the International Court of Justice may be requested to analyze 
without exceeding its  competence  and the procedural  rules,  the status  of individuals  as 
duty-holders,  and  international  responsability  issues.  This  chapter  will  deal  with  two 
situations characterized by the conduct of private persons acting as organs of a State. These 
situations are the following:  
105 Art. 36: “1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters  
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.  2. The  
states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and  
without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the  
Court in all legal disputes concerning:  a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law;  
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d.  
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation /…/”. Statute of 
the International Court of Justice.
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1.- When  it is alleged before the Intenational Court of Justice that a State has not 
complied with the imperative rules of international law (ius cogens). The Court, will 
have to  investigate  about  the conduct  of  the organs of the State,  and to consider 
elements that relate to the crimminal responsability of the individual who is acting on 
behalf of said organs; and 
2.- When it is alleged that an individual who acts as an organ of a State, and is entitled to 
immunity of jurisdiction, has not complied with imperative rules of international law (ius 
cogens) and the International Court of Justice is called upon to decide a dispute between 
two  States  on  the  matter  of  the  admissibility  of  said  immunity  of  jurisdiction  in  the 
circumstances of the specific case.  
The two cases are based on a common assumption, which is the recognition that individuals 
can  be  duty-holders  subject  to  international  responsability  in  case  of  breach  of  an 
imperative rule of international law. 
In  the  Barcelona  Traction  Case106,  the  International  Court  of  Justice pointed  out  the 
characteristics  of  the  obligation  considered  as  based  on  imperative  norms  under 
international law:
  “33 /.../an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another 
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the 
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can 
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes; 
34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from 
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and 
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination/…/”.107
106 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1970, p.3.
107 IBID, para 3 and 4. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the  Legality of Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear  
Weapons, the International Court of Justice stated the “intransgressible principles of humanitarian law” to 
refering to this kind of norms. 
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In  the  “Case  Concerning  the  application  of  the  Convention  of  Prevention  and  
Punshment of the Crime of Genocide”,108 the Court had to determine the scope of its 
own jurisdiction regarding the obligations of individuals derived from alleged breaches of 
imperative rules of international law. Another case to be analysed is the“Arrest Warrant  
Case”,109 where  the  tribunal  was  requested  to  intervene  on  a  matter  related  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  a  foreign  national  courts  with  respect  of  an  individual  bestowed  with 
immunity of jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that the international subjectivity of the 
individual  seen from the perspective  of  his  duties  and responsabilities,  appeared  in the 
background of the matter submitted to the Court. 
In chapter one this study dealt with the issue of “duty-holder” in international law and it 
was said that this concept was related to the possibility of being responsible for the breach 
of an in international obligation.110 The international responsability of the individuals is a 
longstanding concept that emerged in the field of crimminal responsability, namely in the 
field  of  piracy,  crimes  of  war  and  crimes  against  humanity.  There  are  number  of 
international conventions that define as international crimes certain conducts committed by 
individuals. This is the case of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 for the crime of piracy, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide111 and the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment112, among others.
In  case  of  breach  of  imperative  rules  of  international  law,  it  may  arise  a  problem of 
distinguishing between the responsability of the individual himself and the responsability of 
108 Case  Concerning  the  application  of  the  Convention  of  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of 
Genocide, 26 February 2007 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Servia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. (parrafo)
109 Arrest Warrant of 11 April2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports  
2002,p. 3
110 “It has long been held that the individuals were capable of violating international law, irrespectively o  
wheter their punishment was at the hands of the State or more recently of international Courts”.- Tornaritis,  
Criton. G: The Individual as a Subject of International Law.Nicosia, 1972. p. 34.
111 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) 
A, of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December, 1948.
112 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by 
General  Assembly  Resolution  39/46  of  10  December  1984.  Entry  in  force  June  26,  1987. 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp_e.pdf
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the  State  for  the  act  or  omission  of  its  organ.  A court  may  be  confronted  to  two 
responsabilities, States and individual responsability. 
Article 58 of the Draf on Responsability of State for International Wrongfull Acts, Report 
of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, sets out to this 
respect: 
“Individual responsibility: These articles are without prejudice to any question of  
the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf  
of a State.”
This provision features a duality of responsabilities, the eventual individual responsability 
and the State’s own responsability. On the other hand, article 25.4 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (1998)113, provides that:  “(n)o provision in this Statute  
relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsability of States under 
international law.”
In the comments to article 58 of the Draff on State Responsability, the International Law 
Commission says that: “Where crimes against international law are committed by State  
officials, it will often be the case that the State itself is responsible for the acts in question 
or for failure to prevent or punish them. In certain cases, in particular aggression, the  
State will by definition be involved. Even so, the question of individual responsibility is in  
principle distinct from the question of State responsibility. The State is not exempted from  
its  own  responsibility  for  internationally  wrongful  conduct  by  the  prosecution  and  
punishment of the State officials who carried out. Nor may those officials hide behind the  
State in respect of their own responsibility for conduct of theirs which is contrary to rules  
of international law which are applicable to them….The latter is reflected, for example, in  
the  well-established  principle  that  official  position  does  not  excuse  a  person  from 
individual criminal responsibility under international law.”114
 
113http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rome+Statute.htm
114 Comments of the International Law Commission to article 58 of the Draft Article on State Responsability, 
reports of the fifty-seventh session, 2005.
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Eventhough, the State and individual responsabilities  can be considered separatedly, 
there is a close relationship between them, whenever the individual suspected of an 
international crime was taking an official position in the State. Thence, the grave breach of 
international law could be attributed to both subjects under certain circumstances. In cases 
like these,  the Court should proceed to analyze the behaviour of the State’s organs and the 
behaviour of individuals capable of acting on behalf of the State or under the cover of the 
particular organ in breach of international law. 
III. 2. 1. Case Concerning the application of the Convention of 
Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Servia and Montenegro).115 
Facts
On 20 March 1993, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed in the 
Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (with effect from 4 February 2003, “Serbia and Montenegro” and with effect from 3 
June 2006, the Republic of Serbia), in respect of a dispute concerning alleged violations of the 
Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide,  adopted  by  the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948 as well as various matters which 
Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed were connected therewith. The Application invoked Article IX 
of the Genocide Convention as the basis of the jurisdiction of the Court.
 The Judgment
174. “The Court sees nothing in the wording or the structure of the provisions of the 
Convention  relating  to  individual  criminal  liability  which  would  displace  the 
meaning of Article I, read with paragraphs (a) to (e) of Article III, so far as these 
provisions  impose  obligations  on  States  distinct  from the  obligations  which  the 
Convention requires them to place on individuals. Furthermore, the fact that Articles 
V,  VI  and  VII  focus  on  individuals  cannot  itself  establish  that  the  Contracting 
Parties may not be subject to obligations not to commit genocide and the other acts 
enumerated in Article III.”116
179. “Accordingly, having considered the various arguments, the Court affirms that 
the Contracting Parties are bound by the obligation under the Convention not to 
commit, through their organs or persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to 
them, genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III. Thus if an organ of the 
State, or a person or group whose acts are legally attributable to the State, commits 
115 Case  Concerning  the  application  of  the  Convention  of  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Servia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007 ICJ, Judgments, General 
List. 91
116 IBID, para. 174
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any  of  the  acts  proscribed  by  Article  III  of  the  Convention,  the  international 
responsibility of that State is incurred.”117
“(5) Question whether the Court may make a finding of genocide by a State in the  
absence of a prior conviction of an individual for genocide by a competent court
180. The Court observes that if a State is to be responsible because it has breached 
its obligation not to commit genocide, it must be shown that genocide as defined in 
the Convention has been committed.  That  will  also be the case with conspiracy 
under Article III, paragraph (b), and complicity under Article III, paragraph (e); and, 
as  explained  below  (paragraph  431)  for  purposes  of  the  obligation  to  prevent 
genocide.  The  Respondent  has  raised  the  question  whether  it  is  necessary,  as  a 
matter of law, for the Court to be able to uphold a claim of the responsibility of a 
State for an act of genocide, or any other act enumerated in Article III, that there 
should have been a finding of genocide by a court or tribunal exercising criminal 
jurisdiction.  According  to  the  Respondent,  the  condition  sine  qua  non  for 
establishing State responsibility is the prior establishment, according to the rules  
of criminal  law,  of the individual  responsibility  of a  perpetrator  engaging the  
State’s responsibility.”118 (Emphasis added)
181. “The different procedures followed by, and powers available to, this Court and 
to the courts and tribunals trying persons for criminal offences, do not themselves 
indicate that there is a legal bar to the Court itself finding that genocide or the other 
acts enumerated in Article III have been committed. Under its Statute the Court has 
the capacity to undertake that task, while applying the standard of proof appropriate 
to charges of exceptional gravity (paragraphs 209-210 below). Turning to the terms 
of the Convention itself, the Court has already held that it has jurisdiction under  
Article  IX to find a State responsible if  genocide or other acts  enumerated in  
Article  III  are committed  by  its  organs,  or  persons  or  groups  whose acts  are  
attributable to it.”119 (Emphasis added)
182.  “Any other interpretation could entail  that there would be no legal recourse 
available  under  the  Convention  in  some  readily  conceivable  circumstances: 
genocide has allegedly been committed within a State by its leaders but they have 
not been brought to trial because, for instance, they are still very much in control of 
the powers of the State including the police, prosecution services and the courts and 
there is no international penal tribunal able to exercise jurisdiction over the alleged 
crimes; or the responsible  State may have acknowledged the breach.  The Court  
accordingly concludes that State responsibility can arise under the Convention 
for genocide and complicity, without an individual being convicted of the crime or  
an associated one.”120 (Emphasis added)
117 IBID, para. 179
118 IBID, para. 180
119 IBID, para. 181
120 IBID, para. 182
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383.  “Finally,  it  should  be  made  clear  that,  while,  as  noted  above,  a  State’s 
responsibility deriving from any of those acts renders moot the question whether it 
satisfied its  obligation  of prevention in respect  of the same conduct,  it  does not 
necessarily  render  superfluous  the  question  whether  the  State  complied  with  its 
obligation to punish the perpetrators of the acts in question. It is perfectly possible 
for a State to incur responsibility at once for an act of genocide (or complicity in 
genocide, incitement to commit genocide, or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article III) committed by a person or organ whose conduct is attributable to it, and 
for the breach by the State of its obligation to punish the perpetrator of the act: these 
are two distinct internationally wrongful acts attributable to the State, and both can 
be asserted against it as bases for its international responsibility.”121
384. “Having thus explained the interrelationship among the three issues set  out 
above (paragraph 379), the Court will now proceed to consider the first of them. 
This  is  the  question  whether  the  massacres  committed  at  Srebrenica  during  the 
period in question, which constitute the crime of genocide within the meaning of 
Articles II and III, paragraph (a), of the Convention, are attributable, in whole or in 
part, to the Respondent. This question has in fact two aspects, which the Court must 
consider separately. First,  it  should be ascertained whether the acts committed at 
Srebrenica were perpetrated by organs of the Respondent, i.e., by persons or entities 
whose  conduct  is  necessarily  attributable  to  it,  because  they  are  in  fact  the 
instruments of its action. Next, if the preceding question is answered in the negative, 
it should be ascertained whether the acts in question were committed by persons 
who, while not organs of the Respondent, did nevertheless act on the instructions of, 
or under the direction or control of, the Respondent.”122
465.  “It  will  be  clear  from  the  Court’s  findings  above  on  the  question  of  the 
obligation to punish under the Convention that it is satisfied that  the Respondent  
has  outstanding  obligations  as  regards  the  transfer  to  the  ICTY  of  persons 
accused of genocide, in order to comply with its obligations under Articles I and VI 
of  the  Genocide  Convention,  in  particular  in  respect  of  General  Ratko  Mladić 
(paragraph 448). The Court will therefore make a declaration in these terms in the 
operative  clause  of  the  present  Judgment,  which  will  in  its  view  constitute 
appropriate satisfaction.”123
In  the  case  at  hand,  while  the  International  Court  of  Justice  must  decide  on  “civil” 
responsability  of  the  State,  the  International  Crimminal  Court  for  Ex-Yogoslavia  must 
decide on “crimminal” responsibility of the individuals prosecuted for genocide.
 
121 IBID, para. 383
122 IBID, para. 384
123 IBID, para. 465
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Servia  and Montenegro  claim that  the  Convention  on Prevention  of  Genocide only 
result  in  crimminal  responsibility.  As  States  are  not  subject  to  this  type  of 
responsability, the Convention could only give way to individual responsability. This idea 
is supported by the votes of Judges Owada, Tomka, Skotnikov, Shi and Koroma to whom 
such Article was conceived as crime of individuals, and not of a State, so that the ICJ did 
not constitute a proper forum for determining the existence of a crime of genocide.  The 
majority  vote  rejected  this  argument  considering  that  the  Convention  generated 
responsability directly to the States.124 
Scopes seem to be well delimited: civil liability for States, crimminal responsability for 
individuals.  However,  there  is  a  problem  when  individuals  who  are  suspicious  of 
international responsability acted as State agents at the time of breach of imperative rules of 
international law. 
The only way to determines State resposanbility is through an analysis of the behaviour of 
its organs.125 The Respondent (Servia y Montenegro) claimed that a “condition  sine qua 
non for establishing State responsibility is the prior establishment, according to the rules of  
criminal  law,  of  the  individual  responsibility  of  a  perpetrator  engaging  the  State’s  
responsibility.”126 The  Cort  concluded  that State  responsibility  can  arise  under  the  
Convention for genocide and complicity, without an individual being convicted of the crime 
or an associated one.127 
124 See e.g. Turns, David: “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro”.  Melbourne Journal of International law. Vol. 
8. 2007.
125 “/…/the general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that of its  
organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those organs,  
i.e. as agents of the State” -  Comentary of Chapter II, Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its fifty-third sessión. Point 2.
126 Parr. 181 - Case Concerning the application of the Convention of Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Servia and Montenegro). 26 February 2007.
127 Parr. 182 - Case Concerning the application of the Convention of Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Servia and Montenegro). 26 February 2007.
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The  strategy  of  the  defendant  and  the  divided  opinions  of  the  Judges  show  how 
individuals, as duty/liability holders, demand a distinction from the duties and liabilities 
of a State before the International Court of Justice. 
If the State is resposanble for the behaviour of peoples or groups of people,  due to the 
absence or default of official authorities, that is a different scenario. In the latter case, there 
are two different behaviours to be analyzed: the behaviour of the one who commits the 
wrongful act and the behaviour of the one who allows such breach. The above better allows 
distinguishing individual  liability  and State  responsability.  Unlikewise,  in  the preavious 
hypothesis liabilities seem to be linked. 
In cases of breach of imperative rules of the international law, there seems to be the rule 
that  not  only the State  who carried  out  such acts  by means of  its  organs  but  also  the 
individuals who had acted within those organs should also be punished. In this situation, 
there  is  a  fine  line  between  the  analysis  of  international  State  responsibility  and  the 
individual: “/…/a customary international rule on international crimes that has evolved in  
the international  community.  The rule provides that,  in case of perpetration by a state  
official  of such international  crimes as genocide,  crimes against humanity,  war crimes,  
torture (and I would add serious crimes of international, stat-sponsored terrorism), such  
acts, in addition to being imputed to the state of which the individual acts as an agent, also  
involve the criminal liability of the individual. In other words, for such crimes there may 
co-exist state responsibility and individual criminal liability”.128
Article 41 of Draff Articles on State Responsibility provides: “Particular consequences of 
a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter: 1. States shall cooperate to bring to  
an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of article 40. 2. No  
State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning  
of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.  3 This article is  
without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this Part and to such further  
consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international  
128 Cassese, A.: “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?. Some Comments on  
the Congo v. Belgium Case”. EJIL 2002, Vol. 13 No. 4. p. 864
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law.”(Emphasis added). The precision referred to in this Article shall supplement this 
line of reasoning.129 
If this point of view is accepted and it is considered that there has been an internationally 
wrongful act by a State through its organs, there would be a step forward in determining 
responsibility of individual who were in office. The foregoing without prejudice that the 
International Court of Justice is not the one called to determine this.130  
International  Criminal  Courts  are  the  forums before  which  these  individuals  would  be 
judged.  They  have  no  restriction  to  judge  individuals  as  Head  of  State,  Head  of 
Government or Minister in Foreign Affairs. The above has been in article 27 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and in the Chapter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (art. 7), the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (art.7) and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(art. 6).
The matter  that  it  is going to be analyzed hereinafter  is related to whether or not such 
judgments may be undertaken by national or foreign domestic courts. 
III.2. 3.  Arrest Warrant of 1 I April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo  v.   
Belgium)131
129 In the comments the Commission refered: “/…/ paragraph 3 reflects the conviction that the legal regime  
of seriuos breaches is itself in a state of development. By setting out certain basic legal consequences of  
serious breaches in the sense o article 40, article 41 does not intend to preclude the future development of a  
more elaborate regime of consequences entailed by such breaches.”   
130 “La dualidad sanción al Estado-sanción al individuo, tal como lo señaláramos en otros trabajos responde  
al  criterio  de  que  la  “sanción internacional” al  individuo es  una forma de sanción “penal” al  Estado  
responsable  al  sustraerle  a  su  jurisdicción  a  un  nacional  y  someterlo  a  juzgamiento,  aún  contra  su  
voluntad…Creemos que en el caso de violaciones de normas imperativas de derecho internacional general,  
la gravedad de la conducta ilícita hace que la propia naturaleza del tipo de responsabilidad requiera una  
dimensión normativa propia, la de la doble sanción: la tradicional en su condición de ente jurídico y la penal  
a través de la sanción en la persona de los individuos, los que le son sustraídos a su jurisdicción. Si el Estado  
hubiese  adoptado  todas  las  medidas  a  su  alcance  para  impedir  o  sancionar  las  violaciones  a  normas  
imperativas bajo su jurisdicción no hubiese incurrido en responsabilidad internacional y no hubiese cabido 
reclamación  internacional  al  Estado  ni  al  individuo.” –  Zlata  Drnas  de  Clément:  “Responsabilidad 
internacional del Estado por violaciones a normas imperativas del derecho internacional”. Published in Llanos 
Mansilla, H y otros (Ed). Libro Homenaje al Profesor Santiago Benadava.  Santiago de Chile, 2008, p. 10, 
available in www.acaderc.org.ar.
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As stated above,  diplomatic  protection enjoys a renewed rol when dealing with the 
position of individual as right-holders before the International Court of Justice, which is 
a situation that has been acknowledged by tha latter. 
Diplomatic protection and the immunity of jurisdiction are based on the same premises: the 
protection  of  State  sovereignty.  While  the  diplomatic  protection  defends  the  State 
sovereignty, especially State rights, immunities prevent that sovereignty hinders judgement 
of certain acts (functional immunities) or specific individuals (personal immunity), so that 
par in parem non habet imperium (equals have not authority over each other).
It  is  worth noting that  both concepts,  based on the same premise,  have similar  effects. 
Facing  “demands  of  emerging  universal  values”132 or  specific  imperative  rules  of 
international law makes the framwork within which they were conceived more flexible. 
Diplomatic  protection  increases  its  scope  to  the  protection  of  individual  rights,  and 
immunities of jurisdiction restrict their scope to cases in which international crimes have 
been committed. Regarding the latter, immunities of jurisdiction, within the framework of 
State’s actions, do not have effect over the jurisdiction of international courts. However, 
whether jurisdiction over such crimes may be exercised by domestic or foreign courts is 
still a pending matter.133
The  Head  of  State  and  of  Government,  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs,  diplomatic  and 
consular  agents  have  certain  immunities  acknowledged  by  international  law.  Such 
immunities may be personal or functional. 
Personal  immunities  are  a “procedural  defense”134,  granted  to  specific  organs  of  State, 
ussually  Head  of  State  and  of  Government,  and  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs.  These 
immunities protect those individuals before courts of a third State for any act, regardless of 
131 Arrest  Warrant  of  1 I  April  2000 (Democratic  Republic  of  the Congo  v.  Belgium),  Judgment,  I.C.J. 
Reports 2002, p. 3
132 Cassese, A.: “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?. Some Comments on  
the Congo v. Belgium Case”. EJIL 2002, Vol. 13 No. 4, p. 854.
133 “It is increasingly recognized that the principle of universal jurisdiction is an attribute of the existence of 
crimes  under  international  law.”-  Brownlie  Ian:  “Principles  of  Public  International  Law”.  Oxford.  Sixth 
Edition. 2003. New York, p.  3. 
134 Cassese, A.: “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?. Some Comments on  
the Congo v. Belgium Case”. EJIL 2002, Vol. 13 No. 4, pp. 863 -4.
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whether  it  has been carried out as an agent  of the State  or as a private  individual. 
Immunties disappear once that individual ceases in his functions; since that moment 
they may be judged for acts undertaken while on duty.135 
In the Pinochet’s decision, the House of Lords stated that immunity ration personae apply 
only to incumbent holders of office, and it expires as soon as their term in office ends.136
On the other hand, functional immunities protect any State agent from foreign jurisdiction, 
in case of an “official act”; it  “/…/ is grounded on the notion that a state official is not  
accountable to other states for acts that he accomplishes in his official capacity and that  
therefore must be attributed to the state… it is a substantive defence”.137  
Unlike personal immunities, functional immunities or ratione materiae persist, with respect 
to official acts, after the individual has ceased in his functions. The above is a consequence 
of the fact that such acts are not attributable to individuals, but to States. However, the State 
official may be judged at any moment for acts undertaken in his private capacity. 
Facts
The dispute concerning an international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian 
judge against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi. The question submitted to the Court for decision 
remains  whether  the  issue and circulation of  the  arrest  warrant  by the  Belgian judicial 
authorities  against  a  person who was at  that  time the  Minister  for  Foreign Affairs  was 
contrary to international  law.  Belgium contends that  immunities accorded to  incumbent 
Ministers for  Foreign Affairs  may in no case protect them where they are suspected of 
having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The DRC, for its part, states that, 
under international law as it currently stands, there is no basis for asserting that there is any 
135 Article 13 on the  Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in  
International Law’s resolution of the Institut de Droit International, states: “1. A former Head of State (or  
Heads of Governmnet) enjoys no inviolability in the territory of a foreing State. 2. Nor does he or she enjoy  
immunity from jurisdiction, in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, except in respect of acts which 
are performed in the exercise of oficial functions and relate to the exercise thereof. Nevertheless, he or she 
may be prosecuted and traed when the acts allegad constitute a crime under International law, or when they  
are performed exclusively to satisfy a personal interest, or when they consititute a misappropriation of the  
State’s  assets and resources.  3 Neither  does  he or  she enjoy immunity  from execution.  /…/”.  Thirteenth 
Commission, Rappporteur: Mr. Joe Verhoeven.  
136 House  of  Lords,  Regina  v.  Bartle  and  the  Commissioner  of  Police  for  the  Metropolis  and  Others 
(Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench 
Division);  Regina v.  Evans and Another  and the Commissioner  of  Police  for  the Metropolis  and Others 
(Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent), Judgment of 24 March 1999. 
137 Cassese, A.: “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?. Some Comments on  
the Congo v. Belgium Case”. EJIL 2002, Vol. 13 No. 4, p. 863.
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exception to the principle of  absolute immunity from criminal  process of  an incumbent 
Minister for Foreign Affairs where he or she is accused of having committed crimes under 
international law.
The Judgment
49.  “Belgium maintains  for  its  part  that,  while  Ministers  for  Foreign  Affairs  in 
office generally enjoy an immunity from jurisdiction before the courts of a foreign 
State, such immunity applies only to acts carried out in the course of their official 
functions, and cannot protect such persons in respect of private acts or when they 
are acting otherwise than in the performance of their officia1 functions.”138
 53.  “In  customary  international  law,  the  immunities  accorded  to  Ministers  for 
Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective 
performance  of  their  functions  on  behalf  of  their  respective  States.  In  order  to 
determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must therefore first consider the 
nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs. He or she is in 
charge of his or her Government's  diplomatic  activities  and generally  acts  as its 
representative  in  international  negotiations  and  intergovernmental  meetings. 
Ambassadors and either diplomatic agents carry out their duties under his or her 
authority. His or her acts may bind the State represented, and there is a presumption 
that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, simply by virtue of that office, has full powers to 
act on behalf of the State (see, for example, Article 7, paragraph 2 (u), of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). In the performance of their functions, 
he or  she is  frequently  required  to  travel  internationally,  and thus  must  be in  a 
position freely to do so whenever the need should arise. He or she must also be in 
constant  communication  with  the  Government,  and  with  its  diplomatic  missions 
around the world, and be capable at any time of communicating with representatives 
of  other  States.  The  Court  further  observes  that  a  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
responsible  for  the  conduct  of  his  or  her  State's  relations  with  all  other  States, 
occupies a position such that, like the Head of State or the Head of Government, he 
or she is recognized under international law as representative of the State solely by 
virtue of his or her office. He or she does not have to present letters of credence, to 
the  contrary,  it  is  generally  the  Minister  who  determines  the  authority  to  be 
conferred upon diplomatic agents and countersigns their letters of credence. Finally, 
it is to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that chargés d'affaires are accredited.”139
54.  “The  Court  accordingly  concludes  that  the  functions  of  a  Minister  for  
Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or  
she  when  abroad  enjoys  full  immunity  from  criminal  jurisdiction  and 
inviolability.  That  immunity  and  that  inviolability  protect  the  individual  
concerned against any act of authority of another State which would hinder him  
or her in the performance of his or her duties.”140 (Emphasis added)
138 IBID, para. 49
139 IBID, para. 53
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55. “In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a  
Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official” capacity, and those claimed to have  
been  performed  in  a  "private  capacity",  or,  for  that  matter,  between  acts  
performed before the person concerned assumed  office as Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and acts  committed during the period of office. Thus, if  a Minister  for 
Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is clearly 
thereby  prevented  from  exercising  the  functions  of  his  or  her  office.  The 
consequences  of  such impediment  to  the exercise  of  those official  functions  are 
equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs was, at the 
time of arrest, present in the territory of the arresting State on an "official" visit or a 
"private" visit, regardless of whether the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed 
before the person became the Minister  for  Foreign Affairs  or to acts  performed 
while in office, and regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed 
in an "official" capacity or a "private" capacity.  Furthermore,  even the mere risk 
that, by travelling to or transiting another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs might 
be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings could deter the Minister from 
travelling  internationally  when  required  to  do  so  for  the  purposes  of  the 
performance of his or her official functions.”141 
58. “The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national legislation 
and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the House of Lords or the 
French Court of Cassation.  It has been unable to deduce from this practice that  
there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule  
according  immunity  from criminal  jurisdiction  and  inviolability  to  incumbent  
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war  
crimes  or  crimes  against  humanity. The  Court  has  also  examined  the  rules 
concerning the immunity or criminal responsibility of persons having an officia1 
capacity contained in the legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals, 
and which are specifically applicable to the latter (see Charter of the International 
Military  Tribunal  of  Nuremberg,  Art.  7;  Charter  of  the  International  Military 
Tribunal of Tokyo, Art.  6;  Statute of the International  Criminal  Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda,  Art.  6, para.  2;  Statute  of the International  Criminal  Court,  Art.  27). It 
finds  that  these  rules  likewise  do  not  enable  it  to  conclude  that  any  such  an 
exception exists in customary international law in regard to national courts. Finally, 
none of the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, 
or  of  the  lnternational  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  former  Yugoslavia,  cited  by 
Belgium  deal  with  the  question  of  the  immunities  of  incumbent  Ministers  for 
Foreign Affairs before national courts where they are accused of having committed 
war  crimes  or  crimes  against  humanity.  The  Court  accordingly  notes  that  those 
decisions are in no way at variance with the findings it has reached above. In view 
of the foregoing, the Court accordingly cannot accept Belgium's argument in this 
regard.”142 (Emphasis added)
140 IBID, para. 54
141 IBID, para. 55
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60. “The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed 
by  incumbent  Ministers  for  Foreign  Affairs  does  not  mean  that  they  enjoy  
impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their  
gravity.  Immunity  from  criminal  jurisdiction  and  individual  criminal  
responsibility  are  quite  separate  concepts.  While  jurisdictional  immunity  is  
procedural  in  nature,  criminal  responsibility  is  a  question  of  substantive  law. 
Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain 
offences;  it  cannot  exonerate  the  person  to  whom  it  applies  from  all  criminal 
responsibility.”143 (Emphasis added)
61.  “Accordingly,  the  immunities  enjoyed  under  International  law  by  an  
incumbent  or  former  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  do  not  represent  a  bar  to  
criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.
First,  such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their  
own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries' courts in accordance with 
the relevant rules of domestic law.
Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State  
which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity.
Thirdly,  after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law  
in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court  
of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in  
respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well  
as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.
Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to  
criminal  proceedings  before  certain  international  criminal  courts,  where  they  
have  jurisdiction. Examples  include  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the 
former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established 
pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VI1 of the United Nations 
Charter,  and  the  future  International  Criminal  Court  created  by  the1998  Rome 
Convention. The latter's Statute expressly provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that 
"[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person, whether under national or international  law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person".144 (Emphasis added).
The decision refers to the immunity of  jurisdiction and the breach of imperative rules of 
international law, so as to determine the possibility of judgement by foreign national courts. 
142 IBID, para. 58
143 IBID, para. 60
144 IBID, para. 61
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The  solution,  therefore,  would  determine  the  possibility  of  judge  international 
responsability of a given individual.  
The  foregoing decision has been analyzed and criticized in respect with the acts that the 
Court has determined as susceptible of jurisdiction of national courts: Cassesse shares the 
opinion that criticises this judgment and states that:  “It follows that, in the opinion of the  
Court, foreign ministers (and other state officials), after leaving office, may be prosecuted  
and punished for international crimes perpetrated while in office only if such crimes are  
regarded  as  acts  committed  in  their  “private  capacity”,  a  conclusion  that  is  hardly  
consistent with the current pattern of international criminality and surely does not meet the  
demands of international criminal justice.”145 
The matter is related to what was studied in the Prevention of Genocide Case. In case of 
international crimes, there is both State responsibility, and individual responsability. The 
latter may be subject to judgement regardless State immunities before international courts. 
Nevertheless, the possibility to judge such crimes is restricted before national or foreign 
courts.  
According to the decision of the Court, in the case of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Heads of 
State and Heads of Government, the acts that can be judged by foreign domestic courts are: 
 
- Private acts, which may only be judged once the individual has left office. 
Thus, the Court combines personal and functional immunities when analysing the situation 
of a Minister of Foreign Affairs before national and foreign courts.146 While the individual 
is still in office the foreign national court is impeded to judge official or private acts due to 
145 Cassese, A.: “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?. Some Comments on  
the Congo v. Belgium Case”. EJIL 2002, Vol. 13 No. 4, p. 860.
146 “/…/the Court´s failure to distinguish between immunities inuring to state officials with respect to acts 
they perform in their official capacity (so-called functional or ratione materiae immunities) and immunities 
from which some categories of state officials benefit not only for their private life but also, more generally, 
for any act and transaction while in office (so-called personal immunities)”.  Cassese, A.: “When May Senior  
State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?. Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case”. EJIL 
2002, Vol. 13 No. 4. p. 862.
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personal immunities. It is impeded to judge official acts carried out by them due to 
functional immunities as well, even when the individual had ceased in his functions.147  
 
The decision does not determine when an act has been carried out in “private capacity” or 
“official capacity”. Several questions arise as a result of the foregoing: e.g. Is the individual 
acting in this private capacity when acting beyond the limits of his official faculties? In 
order to answer that  question it is pivotal  to determine whether the individual acted on 
behalf of the State or in apparent public functions. Article 3 of the Draf Articles on State 
Responsability of the International Law Commission, provides that: “A particular problem 
is to determine whether a person who is a State organ acts in that capacity. It is irrelevant  
for this purpose that the person concerned may have had ulterior or improper motives or  
may be abusing public power. Where such a person acts in an apparently official capacity,  
or under colour of authority, the actions in question will be attributable to the State. The  
distinction between unauthorized conduct of a State organ and purely private conduct has  
been  clearly  drawn  in  international  arbitral  decision.  For  example,  the  award  of  the  
Mexico-United States General Claims Commission in the Mallen case involved, first, the  
act of an official acting in a private capacity and, secondly, another act committed by the  
same official in his official capacity, although in an abusive way. The latter action was,  
and  the  former  was  not,  held  attributable  to  the  State.  The  French-Mexican  Claims 
Commission in the Caire case excluded responsibility only in cases where “the act had no  
connexion  with  private  individual.  The  case  of  purely  private  conduct  should  not  be  
confused with that of an organ functioning as such but acting ultra vires or in breach of the  
rules governing its operation. In this latter case, the organ is nevertheless acting in the  
name of the State: this principle is affirmed in article 7. In applying this test, of course,  
each case will have to be dealt with on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.”148 
147 “/…/a more radical question to be raised is a follows: why should one confine trials by foreign courts to 
acts performed in a private capacity? Which international rules would exclude official acts?” Cassese, A.: 
“When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?. Some Comments on the Congo v.  
Belgium Case”. EJIL 2002, Vol. 13 No. 4. p.  868.
148 Comentary of art. 4 pto. 13, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third 
sessión. 
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The  above  is  a  noteworthy  point  when considering  that  in  case  of  ultra-vires,  the 
individual  acted  in  his  private  capacity,  and  the  sole  possibility  to  determine 
international  responsibility  of  the  State  would  be  based  on  the  absence  of  oficial 
authorities.149 In  spite  of  it,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that  a  Head of  State  or  Head  of 
Government or a Minister of Foreign Affairs may carry out an international crime, acting in 
his private capacity without looking as an official act. 
The Court made no difference in respect with the quality of the crime. Thus, it made no 
exception to the rule of immunity in international crime cases before domestic or national 
courts. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in “Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom”, followed the 
same reasoning. The Grand Chamber stated that international law has not yet accepted the 
approach that States no longer enjoy immunity before the courts of third States where acts 
of torture or other gross human rights violations are alleged.150 The opposite approach was 
followed  by  the  Greek  Supreme  Court  in “Voiotia Case”151,  as  well  as  by  the  Italian 
Supreme Court in the “Ferrini case”152. In both of them the Courts stated that Germany had 
not  right  to  sovereign  immunity  for  serious  violations  of  human  rights  carried  out  by 
German occupying forces during World War II.153
149 “It might, however, be objected that there is always the possibility of asserting the state´s responsibility 
for a wrongful omission, that is, for the conduct of other organs of the state who failed to prevent the officials 
from committing the genocide, torture, etc. or to punish them. However, it is unsatisfactory that a state should 
be called to account only for failing to prevent the commission on the crimes or for failing to punish the 
wrongdoers, and not be called to account for the crimes themselves.”- Spinedi, Marina: “State Responsibility 
v. Individual Responsibility for International Crimes: Tertium Nod Datur?”. EJIL. 2002. Vol 13 No. 4, pp. 
895 – 899. 
150 See  Markus Rau: “After  Pinochet: Foreign Sovereign Immunity in Respect of Serious Human Rights 
Violations - The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the  Al-Adsani Case”. German Law 
Journal: www.germanlawjournal.com  
151 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Supreme Court (Areiros Pagos) case No. 11/2000, 
4 May 2000. “Greek Court affirmed that the violation of jus cogens norms by Germany should be considered  
as an implied waiver of immunity” -  De Sena, Pasquale y De Vittor, Francesca: State Immunity and Human 
Rigths: The Italian Supreme Court decision on the Ferrini Case. EJIL, 2005, 16 (1), p. 96.
152 “Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany”. Corte di Cassazionne (Sezioni Unite), judgment No 5044 of 6 
Nov. 2003, registered 11 Mar. 2004.
153 “Based upon a systematic interpretation of the international legal order, (the Italian Supreme Court) 
conducted a “balancing of values” between the two fundamental international law principles of the sovereign  
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The latter two decisions, although referring to State immunity, also underline values of 
State sovereignty and values expressed in imperative rules of international law that refer to 
international crimes. This analysis expresses a balance directly transferable to the study of 
individual immunities in case of international crimes.  
The decision of the Court in Arrest Warrant Case, makes the following balance on values:
 
- When  pursuing  possible  international  criminals,  it  identifies  the  International 
Criminal Courts before which individual State immunities are not applicable; and 
- When protecting  State sovereignty, it mantains these individual immunities before 
domestic or foreign national courts, for acts carried out by these individuals in their 
official capacity. 
Doctrine point out that the judgment derives from a demand of a new balance of values that 
gives  way  to  a  greater  framework  for  persecution  of  international  crimes.  The  above 
mentioned allows in these cases the exception of the rule of State immunities before foreign 
domestic courts.154
   
equality of states and of the protection of inviolable human rights …the Court held that the recognition of  
sovereign immunity to states acting in clear contrast with this system of values would surely be incompatible  
with a systematic and consistent interpretation of the international legal order” - De Sena, Pasquale y De  
Vittor, Francesca: State Immunity and Human Rigths: The Italian Supreme Court decision on the Ferrini  
Case. EJIL, 2005, 16 (1), pp.  89 – 100.
154“/…/the ICJ´s obiter dictum, that Ministers of Foreign Affairs are immune for official acts even when they  
are no longer in office, is both not well reasoned and difficult to reconcile with the existing law of state  
immunity.” Spinedi,  Marina:  “State  Responsibility  v.  Individual  Responsibility  for  International  Crimes: 
Tertium Nod Datur?”. EJIL. 2002. Vol 13 No. 4. P. 899. “A survey of the available sources showed that there  
is a strong tendency in international law to deny immunity to state officials who have committed core crimes.  
It has been argued that the best concretization of the existing state practice would be a rule shaped along the  
lines  of  the  Pinochet  decision.  According  to  this  rule,  immunity  ratione  personae  would  grant  effective  
protection (even) against prosecutions for core crimes. However, as immunity ration personae is available  
only to incumbent holders of office, it ceases to protect them as soon as their term of office ends. Thereafter,  
these persons are protected only by immunity ratione materie, which should be interpreted as providing no  
protection against core crimes prosecutions”-  Wirth, S: “Immunity for Core Crimes?. The ICJ´s Judgment in 
the Congo v. Belgium Case”.  EJIL (2002), Vol. 13 No. 4. P. 893. “/…/ the ICJ judgment in the DRC case 
was a setback, a step backwards, in the global fight against the worst atrocities”-  Mbata B Mangu, André: 
“States´rights versus  human and peoples´  rights  in international  law: Sovereign immunity  and universal  
jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice” -  Stell LR 2004-3, p. 498.
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The judgment of the Court limits the scope of individuals as international duty-holders, 
and gives precision to the concept of their international responsability for international 
crimes. In spite of what the Court states about this, the lack and disparity of resolutions as 
well  as of doctrinaire  consensus,  as shown in the Arrest  Warrant  Case,  reflect  that  the 
consequences for international crimes or serious breaches of peremptory norms are mostly 
in a grey area of the international law, in a state which needs development.155  
Conclusion
 
After having pointed out the doctrinary discrepancy regarding the concept of international 
subjectivity, this work identifies four possible criteria for its attribution to a person or an 
entity:
 
1) The holding of rights and duties under international law; 2) the procedural capacity to 
claim rights or be responsible for those duties before international courts; 3) the possibility 
of enforcement or implementation of a judgment or resolution passed by an international 
court; 4) the participation in different processes of creation of international law. 
Taking into account these criteria the analysis of the status of the individual as subject of 
international law on the basis of the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice  and  the  International  Court  of  Justice  shows  the  relevance  of  the  two  first 
categories.  It  means  that  in practice,  the international  jurisprudence has highlighted the 
rights  and duties  allocated  to  the individual  under  international  law and the procedural 
capacity to claim said rights or being and bear responsibility accordingly. 
This study has tried to assert how it is possible that in a gradual way, over time, due to the 
existence of new conditions in the international arena, the individual evolved from being 
155 See commentary of Art. 41. P. 13. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-
third session. 
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considered a mere object of law into a subject of international law, endowed with rights 
and duties under international law. 
This paper  has also pointed out that,  in  spite  of the lack of procedural  capacity  of the 
individual to bring claims before the Court, there seems to be a way for him to put a claim 
in the international sphere, by means of the diplomatic protection, which is to some extent 
an  instrument  to  protect  human  rights  when  there  are  no  other  direct  mechanisms  of 
protection.  This  development  constitutes  a  factor  to  consider  in  all  studies  on  the 
international subjectivity of the individual. 
In the last section of this study, I had the opportunity to assess how close the link between a 
State and an individual can be whenever the responsibility for international crimes is at 
stake. The analysis of the subject matter by the International Court of Justice, under the 
heading  of  international  responsability  of  the  State  as  well  as  the  reduced  role  of 
immunities in the case of individuals subject to international criminal courts, shows this 
evolution. 
The international order of human rights composed of several regimes and instruments that 
grants  rights  and  impose  duties  directly  to  the  individuals,  this  situation  continues  to 
influence  the  evolution  of  general  international  law,  and  it  is  also  reflected  in  the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.156 The confrontation of values between 
the  State  sovereignty  and  the  universal  respect  of  human  rights,  seems  to  lead  to  a 
promising  and  persistent  trend  for  the  consideration  of  the  individual  as  a  subject  of 
156 “Neither the Permanent Court nor the International Court of Justice are human rights courts as such. But  
their subject matter jurisdiction is without limitation and insofar as the violation of human rights is also a  
breach of international law the potential exists for human rights litigation in the World Court”-   Higgins, 
Rosalyn: “The International Court of Justice and Human Rights”. International Law: Theory and Practice, 
Essays in Honour of Eric Suy. Edited by Karel Wellens. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. The Hague. 1998, p. 
691.  Other examples are “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian  
Territory, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 2004, p. 136”, where the Court analysed the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and upheld its 
application together  with human rights  treaties  in wartime.  Likewise  in  the Case Concerning  the Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) v. Uganda, Judgment of 19 Dec. 
2005, General List No. 116, la Corte determined the violation by Uganda of the human right law (parr. 216). 
Currently, the case of: “Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)”, 
constitutes  the  first  case  brought  before  the  ICJ  on the  basis  of  the  United  Nations  Convention against 
Torture.
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international law. The flexibilization of institutions of classical international law such 
as the diplomatic  protection and the immunities of jurisdiction shows a limit  to the 
State  sovereignty favouring a greater  participation of the individual  in the international 
community. 
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